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Complementarity and Financial Systems 











Individual financial systems can be understood as very specific configurations of certain key 
elements. Often these configurations remain unchanged for decades. We hypothesize that 
there is a specific relationship between key elements, namely that of complementarity. Thus, 
complementarity seems to be an essential feature of financial systems.  
Intuitively speaking, complementarity exists if the elements of a (financial) system reinforce 
each other in terms of contributing to the functioning of the system. It is the purpose of this 
paper to provide an analytical clarification of the concept of complementarity. This is done by 
modeling financial systems as combinations of four elements: firm-specific human capital of 
an entrepreneur, the ability of a bank to restructure the borrower's firm in the case of distress, 
the possibility to appropriate private benefits from running the firm, and the bankruptcy law. 
A specific configuration of these elements constitutes one financial system.  
The bankruptcy law and the potential private benefits are treated as exogenous. They 
determine the bargaining power of the contracting parties in the case that recontracting 
occurs. In a two-stage game, the optimal values for the other elements are determined by the 
agents individually - by investing in human capital and restructuring skills, respectively - and 
jointly by writing, executing and possibly renegotiating a financing contract for the firm. The 
paper discusses the equilibria for different types of bankruptcy law and demonstrates that 
equilibria exhibit the sought-after feature of complementarity. Three particularly significant 
equilibria correspond to stylized accounts of the British, German and the US-American 
financial system, respectively. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1   The problem 
Financial systems are complex institutional arrangements. Their mere description is a difficult 
task for researchers as there is no consensus concerning the questions which elements should 
be considered as important and thus included in the description of a financial system, and how 
the various elements interact and how this should be reflected in the description. 
Evidently, this is an important shortcoming, as only an understanding of the interplay of its 
elements can help us in understanding the structure and functions of financial systems in 
general and in assessing the proper functioning of a given financial system. 
Even a brief look at existing financial systems shows that they are very specific 
configurations of core elements. The fact that these specific configurations often remain 
unchanged over decades suggests that they constitute an essential feature of any financial 
system. But what could account for this stability? Our hypothesis is that it is the feature of 
complementarity of the (key) elements of such a system.
1 The elements of a system are called 
complementary with respect to each other if they interact in such a way that increasing the 
value of one element leads to nonnegative marginal returns from increasing the value of other 
elements. A system with complementary elements typically has more than one equilibrium in 
the sense of a local maximum. These equilibria are characterized by "extreme" values of the 
relevant variables: distinct sets of values of the system's elements "fit together" well and 
constitute "good" solutions for the problem under consideration. We discuss the concept of 
complementarity more fully in section 2.5.4 below. In our opinion, complementarity is the 
intrinsic reason for the systemic character of financial systems, for the perceived differences 
among financial systems in the real world and for their persistence over time.  
It is the objective of this paper to clarify this concept of complementarity and to illustrate its 
relevance for the analysis and the design of financial systems. We do this by building a game-
theoretic model of a stylized financial system. The model covers a time span of two periods 
and includes an entrepreneur and a bank. As he does not have the necessary funds, the 
entrepreneur seeks financing for a potentially worthwhile investment project from a bank. The 
project can be initiated at the beginning of the first period and provides an uncertain payoff at 
the end of the second period. The payoff depends on the level of the firm-specific human 
capital investment of the entrepreneur during the first period. After the first period, a signal 
concerning the payoff is observed by the entrepreneur, the bank and, yet with a lower 
precision, by third parties such as a bankruptcy court. The value of this signal can have two 
consequences, one being a risk-increasing change of the investment project, and the other one 
a possible recontracting covering, among other things, a change of the right to decide about 
the investment project. How the bank can, and might want to, act in the case of a 
renegotiation depends on the level of restructuring capability which she has built up during 
the first period. Both the optimal human capital investment decision of the entrepreneur and 
                                                 
1 For general analyses of complementarity refer to Milgrom/Roberts (1995), regarding financial systems refer to 
Franks/Mayer (1995) and Schmidt/Tyrell (1997). Schmidt/Spindler (1998) explore the implications of 
complementarity on the path dependency of financial systems. 
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the decision of the bank to acquire restructuring capabilities depend on the quality of the 
project, the character of the bankruptcy law and certain other parameters. These factors are 
exogenous to the model, whereas the levels of human capital and restructuring capabilities as 
well as the outcome of a possible renegotiation and of the continuation of the project are 
determined by the interplay of the strategies pursued by the entrepreneur and the bank.  
Various problems complicate the relationship between the entrepreneur and the bank: 
(1) At the end of the first period, both agents observe a signal which enables them to perfectly 
anticipate the cash flows generated by the project in a later period. However, third parties, 
such as bankruptcy courts, can only discriminate between a ”high” and a ”low” value of 
the signal. We define ”high” as guaranteeing a sufficient cash flow for paying back the 
loan. Thus ”low” values of the signal indicate ”financial distress”. As a consequence, any 
clause of the initial contract referring to events such as renegotiations and a transfer of 
control over the assets of the firm after the first period can only be made contingent upon 
the incident of financial distress. The initial contract must also be incomplete with respect 
to the amounts invested in specific human capital and restructuring skills, respectively, as 
both are assumed to be nonverifiable. 
(2) After having observed the signal, the entrepreneur can alter the risk profile of the project 
in a way which gives him the opportunity to divert cash flows away from the project into 
his own pockets. The risky action reduces the anticipated verifiable part of the final payoff 
that can be claimed by the bank according to the contract, and thus creates a moral hazard 
problem. 
(3) Renegotiations ensuing bankruptcy procedures may lead to an inefficient liquidation of 
the firm’s assets giving the bank all the proceeds and making the entrepreneur’s specific 
human capital worthless, which in turn constitutes a social loss. 
(4) The level of acquired firm-specific human capital and the final payoff of the project are 
positively correlated, ascribing a second, i.e. socially desired, effect to specific human 
capital. 
Thus the model incorporates aspects of incomplete contracts, moral hazard, agency costs and 
specific human capital. Their interplay determines the complexity of the decisions of the 
agents at both the beginning and the end of the first period. We model the financing problem 
from the perspective of the entrepreneur. He selects his profit maximizing strategy subject to 
the participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the bank.  
Where are the financial systems aspects and the feature of complementarity in the model? It 
seems straightforward to interpret an equilibrium configuration comprising a specific 
bankruptcy regime, particular opportunities to appropriate private benefits and certain levels 
of firm-specific human capital and restructuring capabilities of banks, respectively, as 
representing a particular financial system. As will be shown when we determine possible 
equilibria resulting from the optimal strategies of the agents in conjunction with the external 
factors, the equilibrium values which the endogenous variables take on will exhibit 
complementarity, i.e. mutually determine and reinforce their "effectiveness", and they are, in 
turn, complementary to exogenous factors. An entrepreneur facing a creditor-friendly 
bankruptcy law will tend to turn to a bank capable of restructuring and invest the maximum 
amount into his specific human capital, while he will get his loan from an arm’s-length-type 
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bank and build up only the minimum amount of specific human capital necessary, should he 
be confronted with a debtor-friendly law. Further results of our analysis are that the first 
(second) equilibrium becomes more stable, the higher (lower) the upper bound for the cash 
flows that can be privately diverted by the entrepreneur, the higher (lower) the private costs of 
a loss of control to the entrepreneur, and the lower (higher) the proceeds from liquidation. 
As far as the modeling technique is concerned, we apply the perfect-equilibrium concept from 
game theory and, because the objective function includes discrete arguments, we borrow 
some concepts from lattice theory. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature. In part 2, we 
will first characterize the project, the agents, their choice variables, and the bankruptcy 
regime and then analyze the optimal strategies for the entrepreneur and the bank(s). Part 3 
discusses similarities between our model and stylized facts of the financial systems of 
Germany, Great Britain and the United States. Part 4 shall prove the relevance of the model 
and concludes. 
 
1.2  Review of the literature 
Our model relates to various issues currently discussed in the finance- and in the economics 
and law literature. As the models of Aghion/Bolton (1992) and Hart (1995) our model rests 
on the important notion that financial contracts do not only assign claims on cash flows but do 
also allocate conditional control rights over a firm’s assets.
2 Proceeding from this insight we 
analyze the effect of different bankruptcy schemes on attributes of contract and potentially 
ensuing control right allocations. 
The model itself bears some resemblance to the approach chosen in Berglöf (1994).
3 The 
author derives the optimal allocation of control rights for a financing relationship, that is 
characterized by conflicts of interest between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist. By 
investing in firm-specific human capital the entrepreneur is able to increase the value of 
potential private benefits that he may extract from the firm’s operations. Simultaneously he 
has to bear in mind that a sale of the firm by the venture capitalist may preclude him from 
extracting these very benefits. Ex ante, this tradeoff may under certain circumstances induce 
the entrepreneur not to invest into specific human capital at all. On the other hand the venture 
capitalist has to fear that the entrepreneur sells his shares in the firm to a third party which 
could then take measures that would dilute the value of the venture capitalist’s shares. The 
analogy between Berglöf (1994) and our model becomes apparent if one hypothetically 
replaces the venture capitalist by a bank and the decision to sell the firm by the decision to 
liquidate it. There exist, however, important differences between the two models. Berglöf 
(1994) differentiates only between two possible project outcomes, i.e. a good one and a bad 
                                                 
2 See also Berglöf/von Thadden (1994), Dewatripont/Tirole (1994) and Laux (1996). 
3 See also Holmström/Tirole (1997). 
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one. Compared to our model this considerably reduces the set of alternative contracts and the 
set of actions to be taken by the participants.
4 
Furthermore, the venture capitalist can only sell the firm. It is ruled out that he is able to 
increase his expected return ex ante by investing in firm-specific capabilities (”restructuring 
skills” in the terminology of our model). Finally – and this is the most important difference to 
our model – the implications of different bankruptcy laws are not considered in Berglöf 
(1994). 
Bankruptcy law itself is the subject of an extensive empirical and theoretical literature. 
Relevant empirical sources will be discussed in the last part of the paper. Most of the 
theoretical work analyzes the ex post efficiency of particular bankruptcy schemes and thus 
does not examine the ex ante implications of bankruptcy law attributes on the decisions made 
by debtor firms and creditors, e.g. the decision to invest in firm-specific human capital, to 
mitigate information asymmetries or to conduct private renegotiations. Examples for this 
branch of the literature include Bebchuk (1988), Aghion/Hart/Moore (1992), Franks/Nyborg 
(1994) and White (1994). Exceptions are Gertner/Scharfstein (1991) and Detragiache (1994), 
who analyze explicitly the implications of the bankruptcy law on the creditors’ decision 
whether to provide the funds for a specific project at all.
5 In marked contrast to our model, 
however, the authors lay their focus on coordination problems among multiple creditors. 
Bebchuk/Picker (1992) and Berkovitch/Israel/Zender (1993) analyze the implications on 
human capital investments, but do not regard the nature of the debtor-creditor relationship. 
The advantages of close relationships are analyzed in depth in the work of Diamond 
(1984,1991), Rajan (1992), Dewatripont/Maskin (1995) and von Thadden (1995). Again, 
bankruptcy law is not within the scope of their models. 
Concerning its main argument, our work is most akin to Hauswald (1996) and 
Berkovitch/Israel (1995). They perceive financial systems as a set of various elements which 
have to ”fit” together in order to optimally fulfill their respective functions. 
Hauswald (1996) examines efficiency related attributes of both universal banking systems and 
specialized banking systems where commercial banking is separated from investment 
banking. In his model of incomplete contracts all three types of banks may build up 
restructuring skills enabling them to restructure financially distressed firms and thereby to 
avoid inefficient liquidations. However, only universal banks may grant loans and at the same 
time hold equity stakes in the debtor firm. He finds that the only renegotiation-proof contract 
is a mixed-finance contract and as a consequence, only universal banks will typically have 
incentives to bear the cost of developing restructuring skills ex ante. In financial systems 
characterized by specialized banking, alternative devices to avoid inefficient liquidations will 
be employed, the most prominent being an active market for corporate takeovers. 
The optimality of the mixed finance contract relies on the somewhat implausible assumption, 
that not only the universal bank, but also the other shareholders participate in the positive 
returns from restructuring. It should seem more realistic to assume that the bank recapture the 
                                                 
4 It is questionable whether the results in Berglöf (1994) remain unchanged if more possible states are 
introduced into the model as the rule for allocating control rights contingent upon the project return would 
have to be quite different. 
5 For an examination of ex ante implications of the old German bankruptcy law, see Schmidt (1981).  
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entire return or at least that the sharing rule be determined by a particular bankruptcy law. In 
addition, empirical evidence for the prevalence of mixed finance contracts in universal 
banking systems is hard to find. Especially in the case of small and medium size enterprises 
do such contracts seem to be rare exceptions (see for example Edwards/Fischer (1994)). 
Specific human capital plays no role in Hauswald’s model. 
Berkovitch/Israel (1995) present an approach that can be interpreted as complementary to our 
own. They analyze a financing problem in which a debtor obtains private benefits from the 
continuation of his firm’s operations but nothing if the firm is liquidated. Hence, he will never 
concede to a liquidation, even if this would constitute the ex post efficient outcome.
6 Moral 
hazard may thus lead to an underinvestment problem in the model. In analyzing its magnitude 
they distinguish between two regimes that differ with respect to the nature of the debtor-
creditor relations. In one regime, the entrepreneur knows exactly how well the bank is 
informed about the quality of the project. In the other regime the relationship is ”at arm’s 
length”, so that the entrepreneur cannot assess the quality of the bank’s information under any 
circumstances. For each regime they then derive the optimal bankruptcy law, i.e. one that 
minimizes the magnitude of the respective underinvestment problem. They prove that a close 
relationship implies a creditor-friendly bankruptcy law, whereas an arm’s length relationship 
is best governed by a debtor-friendly bankruptcy law. The rationale behind this result follows 
from the strategic value of the debtor’s information about the bank. A well informed debtor 
will choose his optimal ex post strategy contingent upon the bank’s information and can thus 
reduce the probability of a liquidation. A creditor-friendly bankruptcy law counterbalances 
this effect by advocating the bank’s attempts to liquidate. 
The main difference to our model is that Berkovitch/Israel treat the nature of the creditor-
debtor relationship as exogenous and the characteristics of the bankruptcy law as endogenous. 
We pursue the opposite approach by treating the bankruptcy law as exogenous and the both 
the bank’s decision to acquire restructuring skills and the entrepreneur’s decision to invest in 
firm-specific human capital as endogenous. 
 
2 The  model 
2.1  Sequence of events and information structure 
The model extends over two periods and three points in time. At t=0 an entrepreneur
7 with 
zero wealth offers a financial contract to an investor. According to the contract the investor 
provides the funds I to invest into a positive-NPV-project at t=0 and the entrepreneur is 
obliged to make a repayment of D at t=2. 
                                                 
6 Berkovitch/Israel assume that the private benefits do not disappear through a liquidation. Rather, the firm is 
sold as a going concern and the new manager-owner can seize the private benefits otherwise appropriated by 
the initial entrepreneur. This has the important implication that a liquidation prompted by the bank will always 
be efficient. Hence a source of inefficiencies covered by our model is ruled out in their model. 
7 In the remainder of the text we use the terms ”entrepreneur”, ”firm” and ”debtor” synonymously. For the 
rationale, please refer to section 2.2.1. 
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We assume that the entrepreneur can only offer a standard credit contract to the investor.
8 In 
fixing the nominal amount D of the credit, he implicitly determines the nominal rate of return 
to the investor (who is in the basic model called a bank).
9 We consider a risk neutral 
economy. 
If the bank accepts the contract, the project is started immediately. Also at t=0, the 
entrepreneur (the firm) makes a decision concerning the investment in firm-specific human 
capital H∈ [0,h] and the bank decides whether to the invest the fix amount r into restructuring 
skills. 
After one period, at t=1, a random signal x ~ can be observed by both the entrepreneur and the 
bank. The distribution of x ~ is common knowledge ex ante: x ~ is uniformly distributed on the 
interval [0, x ] and serves as a perfect predictor of the achievable total pay off π~ = x ~+α H at 
t=2.  π~  thus comprises a random component and a component which will be described in 
detail in section 2.2.1. Accordingly, π~  is a random variable uniformly distributed on the 
interval [α H, x +α H]. 
After observing x, both parties already know at t=1 whether the firm will be able to repay D in 
full or rather default on the loan and only pay a fraction of D. It is essential that the exact 
forecast of the total project payoff is not verifiable, such that third parties like courts do not 
know by how much the entrepreneur might default. However, we assume that from observing 
x a court can derive correctly whether the total payoff π  will be sufficient to pay D to the bank 
or whether the firm winds up in financial distress.
10  
The occurrence of a signal predicting a total payoff that is smaller than the repayment amount 
D thus implies a verifiable breach of the original contract. As a result, the bank may legally 
claim control over the firm’s assets.
11 We define financial distress as a situation in which the 
value of the project is not sufficient to cover the obligation toward the creditor(s)
12 and where 
two parties with conflicting interests but symmetric information enter renegotiations over the 
initial credit contract signed at t=0. In addition to the initiation of renegotiations based on the 
legal right of the bank, such a renegotiation can also be started if both parties agree that 
                                                 
8 The restriction on the set of feasible contracts may seem to be an arbitrary assumption, as it should be 
principally be also possible to finance the project for instance with venture capital. However, we assume the 
optimality of credit contracts to stem from verification costs regarding the project’s payoffs in t=2 as in 
Townsend (1979) or Gale/Hellwig (1985). For the sake of simplicity we did not model these verification costs 
explicitly. 
9 The optimality of a bank in this context could be derived from the model of Diamond (1984) in connection 
with costly state verification costs. 
10 A possible interpretation for this assumption is that outside parties are usually endowed with much less 
information concerning the quality of the project and its progress, so that they are only vaguely able to 
distinguish the two general states, i.e. financial distress and financial health. Evaluation mistakes are 
sufficiently rare, so that a consideration of an inadequate decision by a court does not effect the entrepreneur’s 
choice of a payoff-maximizing contract ex ante. 
11 See Hart (1995, p.101): ”One of the most basic features of a debt contract is the idea that what triggers a shift 
in control is the non-payment of a debt.” 
12 Wruck (1990), p.421, differentiates between a technical insolvency, which requires a negative net value of the 
equity position and insolvency in a cash-flow sense, which is given when a firm cannot fulfill its current 
financial obligations. In the simplified world of our model a firm with a negative value is certain to be unable 
to meeting its repayment obligations, so that our notion of insolvency covers both of the above definitions. 
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changing the contractual allocation of control increases the final payoffs, irrespective of 
whether the firm is in financial distress or not (see section 2.4). 
As we will demonstrate below, and as intuition clearly suggests, the decision to start 
renegotiations, the possible options of the two agents in the negotiations, and their outcome 
strongly depend on the ability of the bank to restructure the firm and on the type of the 
bankruptcy law that is in force. A formalization of such interactions between private 
renegotiations and verifiable contingencies is typical for incomplete contract models.
13 
If at t=1 the entrepreneur emerges from the renegotiations as still being in control, he will 
select an action from the set {a0, ab,aL} at the beginning of the second period. In case the bank 
is assigned the control, the measures she can possible take depend on whether she has, at t=0, 
invested in her capabilities of restructuring the firm in case it falls into distress. 
The entrepreneur’s riskless action a0 results in a sure payoff of π =x+α H at t=2. The risky 
action ab can lead to two possible, and equally probable, values for the payoff. In one state the 
total payoff will be ”high”, amounting to π =x+α H+b, but the entrepreneur will be in a 
position to appropriate all of b, so that only π CASH=x+α H will remain for repaying the loan. In 
the other state, business deteriorates and both the total payoff π  and its verifiable component 
π CASH turn out ”low”. They decline to π CASH  =  π   =  x+α H-b. The risky action ab thus 
constitutes a mean-preserving spread and can be interpreted as one, which induces the 
entrepreneur to concentrate all of his efforts on the appropriation of private benefits and hence 
to neglect other essential management activities, so that customers may turn away or costs 
may increase dramatically. 
The third action aL will lead to an immediate liquidation of the firm. The sale of the assets 
will yield the total payoff L+α H. The entrepreneur and all employees will have to leave the 
firm and as a consequence will suffer from the deterioration of the value of their specific 
human capital, which they cannot employ in other firms. Their private costs will amount to H 
(refer to the next section for more details). 
At t=2 the payoff π  is realized and the project is terminated. π  is only verifiable in its cash 
components  x+α H and x+α H-b, respectively, but not in its private benefits. The bank 
receives the smaller of her contractual cash flow rights D and the portion π CASH of realized 
total payoffs. Table 1 summarizes the sequence of actions in our model. 
 
t=0 t=1  t=2 
   The firm offers a debt contract to 
the bank 
   The firm decides whether to invest 
in firm-specific human capital 
   The bank decides whether to invest 
in restructuring skills 
   Signal  x ~  occurs 
   Control over the firms assets is 
allocated 
   Action ai is selected 
   Payoff π  is realized and 
distributed to the entrepreneur 
and the bank 
Table 1: Time line of events 
 
                                                 
13 See for instance Hart/Moore (1998). 
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2.2  The contract parties 
2.2.1  The entrepreneur (the firm) 
In order to capture as many implications of investments into firm-specific human capital as 
possible, we base our analysis on a relatively comprehensive notion of ”entrepreneur”. We do 
not define ”entrepreneur” in the narrow sense of the manager-owner
14 of a firm but rather 
extend the notion onto most of the firm’s employees. We thereby implicitly assume that the 
firm’s strategic decisions are made only after employees have been consulted and an 
agreement between management and employees has been achieved (amounting to some from 
of codetermination) or, alternatively, that the manager and the employees have common 
interests, e.g. because they are members of the same family. We shall mention that this 
comprehensive notion is not necessary for the model to work but simply allows for a more 
intuitive treatment of firm-specific human capital and thus for a richer interpretation of the 
results. 
At  t=0 the entrepreneur (the firm) decides on his (its) investment in human capital. The 
investment amount h, that should be optimally invested depends on the production technology 
inherent to the project in question. He can invest the amount h into two different categories of 
human capital. One alternative is to acquire general skills (or to train his employees these 
skills) that can be directly employed by other firms with comparable production technologies. 
Should the entrepreneur (or an employee) leave the firm, his chances of immediately finding 
an adequate employment with another firm are then assumed to be high. The second 
alternative is to acquire skills which are highly specific to the project and thus to the firm 
itself. Building up firm-specific human capital has two implications. Firstly, it allows the firm 
to configure machines better, implement better processes, refine product and service ideas, 
etc. As a consequence of the specific investment, both the final payoff of the project and the 
firm’s liquidation value
15 will increase by α H. The publicly observable parameter α  
circumscribes the sensitivity of the production technology with respect to the firm-specificity 
of the firm’s human capital and H denotes the portion of h that had been invested in firm-
specific human capital (H∈ [0,h]). Secondly, we assume that the human capital of the manager 
(and his employees) is so specific to his (their) firm that it cannot be directly employed by 
other firms, which may require a very different specific skillset. Should the manager (the 
employees) be forced out of his (their) distressed firm he (they) will find it extremely difficult 
to get adequate employment somewhere else.
16 Search costs, opportunity costs from 
                                                 
14 As the project is fully financed by external debt-capital, “owner” is equivalent to “residual claimant” in our 
context.  
15 We assume that potential buyers of the liquidation assets are able to observe the quality of machine 
configuration and product ideas (patents) and are hence willing to pay a higher price if those assets had been 
employed by employees with firm- or asset-specific human capital. A convenient implication of this 
assumption is that the mathematical expressions in the subsequent sections are considerably simplified. 
However, the results of the model would remain qualitatively unchanged if we assumed the liquidation payoff 
to be equal to L. 
16 In case of a liquidation of his firm, the owner-manager will loose his reputation as a successful entrepreneur 
and will not be able to start a new project immediately. 
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temporary unemployment and wage discounts in subsequent occupations are assumed to add 
up to an amount equal to the initial investment in firm-specific human capital H.
17  
In determining the optimal investment amount H ex ante, the firm thus faces a tradeoff: 
Investing in firm-specific human capital will strictly increase the final payoff of the project by 
α H but may also lead to a private loss H should the firm be liquidated at t=1.
18 The ex ante 
probability of such a liquidation and thus the expected size of the loss will depend on the 
bank’s incentives to liquidate, which in turn crucially depend on her capabilities to restructure 
a distressed firm and on the nature of the bankruptcy law that is force. These determinants 
will be discussed in the following two sections. 
As a consequence of the assumptions concerning the set of feasible financial contracts and the 
investment in specific human capital our model applies primarily to small and medium size 
enterprises. We may neglect conflicts of interest between owners, managers and employees as 
they typically occur in larger firms. 
 
2.2.2 The  bank 
At t=0 the bank has to determine whether or not to invest an amount r into her capability to 
restructure the financially distressed firm after t=1.
19 If she does invest, she becomes a bank 
of type R=r, which has the necessary entrepreneur- and firm-specific information to prevent 
the debtor from extracting the nonverifiable private benefits b and thereby diluting the value 
of the firm for the bank, if he should select action ab at t=1. The capability to restructure can 
thus be interpreted as an indication of a close relationship between the debtor and the creditor, 
through which a lot of information are exchanged. We assume that this capability is not 
observable by third parties and not transferable onto other creditors. 
On the other hand, even after investing r, the bank does not have enough information to 
implement the riskless action a0 all by herself and thereby to substitute the entrepreneur’s and 
his employees’ expertise completely. Therefore if she wants to continue the firm even though 
she may have the right to discontinue and liquidate it, the bank will depend on the 
entrepreneur to a certain extent. As a consequence of this dependence, the entrepreneur will 
remain in office and will not incur a private loss. Neither will the employees be inflicted by a 
deterioration of the value of their firm-specific human capital. Thus, they are merely no 
longer able to extract the private benefits b from the firm. Hence, it is only the sharing rule 
                                                 
17 For empirical evidence on private costs to employees please refer to FN. 54. See also Gilson (1989), who 
points to “significant personal costs to corporate managers” because of (1) a loss of future income, (2) loss of 
firm-specific human capital, (3) loss of power, prestige, or other nonpecuniary benefits and (4) adverse 
reputation effects. Chang/Wang (1995) present a theoretical model on the relationship between investments in 
value enhancing specific human capital and potential private losses to employees. 
18 In a complete-contract setting, the entrepreneur would invest H=h, if h·(xL*/x )<α ·h  is satisfied, where 
(xL*/x ) denotes the first-best ex ante liquidation probability. In this case, the positive marginal return from 
firm-specific human capital outweighs its expected costs to the firm. 
19 We assume that gathering information about a specific firm is costly and that these costs are fixed cost. This 
concurs with assumptions made in the standard literature on the informational efficiency of capital markets 
(e.g. Grossman/Stiglitz (1980)). As suggested by intuition, investing r is only observable to the debtor-firm 
but not to any third party. 
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applied to the final payoff that is altered. The amount b remains in the firm and will be a part 
of what the bank gets if the firm is unable to fulfill its contractual obligation. 
In case the bank does not invest in restructuring skills (R=0), she will not be able to gather the 
firm-specific information necessary to restructure the distressed firm at t=1. However, the 
information at hand will be sufficient to interpret the value of the signal x ~ correctly and thus 
provide an important advantage over outsiders. Should a signal smaller than D-α H occur, she 
may only choose one out of two actions: either remain passive and let the entrepreneur extract 
private benefits or attempt a liquidation. 
We assume perfect competition in the capital markets and may thus restrict our analysis to 
one representative transaction between a bank and a firm. At t=0 the firm makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the bank with respect to the nominal amount I of the loan and the nominal 
repayment amount D. As a profit-maximizing entity, the firm will choose an amount D which 
will lead to an expected profit of exactly zero for the bank, if she makes the ”right” decision 
concerning the investment in her own capability to restructure the firm. In case of a deviation 
her expected payoff from the transaction will turn negative. The bank’s participation- and 
incentive compatibility
20 constraints hence require that the sum of the initial investments I 
and R equal her expected payoff at t=2. Finally, when formulating the offer, the debtor has to 
satisfy his own incentive compatibility constraint with respect to the optimal investment H 
into firm-specific human capital
21. 
 
2.3  The bankruptcy law 
”Bankruptcy represents a legal framework for recontracting when various interested parties 
cannot reach an accord following a firm’s default on a debt contract” (Weiss (1990)). In 
today’s developed economies, these legal frameworks represent very complex arrangements 
of legal procedures implying different allocations of rights. As it would be a formidable task 
to account for all potential characteristics of these procedures in a comparative economic 
model, we need to simplify dramatically. However, we shall attempt to capture in our 
snapshot three essential aspects with their ex ante implications that nearly all bankruptcy laws 
have in common: Firstly, as liquidation is the basic procedure of every bankruptcy law, we 
shall define which parties may file for such a procedure and which rights are assigned to each 
party therein. Secondly, we shall account for the empirical fact that most bankruptcy 
procedures impose nontrivial direct costs on the participants and in particular on the 
debtholders. Thirdly, for those instances in which the creditor does not prefer to liquidate the 
firm, we shall define some form of bargaining over a restructuring (refer to section 3.1 for 
empirical evidence on the bankruptcy laws of the USA, Great Britain, and Germany). 
Concerning the implications of the three aspects, our model should allow for deviations from 
                                                 
20 For a proof of incentive compatibility, please refer to Appendix 1. 
 
21 A typical loan contract in our model may be formulated as follows: ”At t=0 the bank has to pay the amount I 
to the firm and in exchange obtains a repayment D at t=2.” A definition for financial distress directly follows: 
If a signal x<D-α ·H occurs, both parties know with absolute certainty that the firm will not be able to honor 
the contract at t=2. Because it is exactly this characteristic of the signal which is verifiable, third parties are 
aware of the firm’s breach of contract. 
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an absolute priority rule, i.e. for outcomes in which parties holding junior claims (e.g. the 
residual claimants) receive payments although the senior creditor has not been repaid in full, 
and for the possibility that a distressed firm may continue operating in the same line of 
business. 
The restructuring procedure can only be filed by the bank. She has to commit herself vis-à-
vis the courts to restructure the firm – thereby guaranteeing its continuation - and will then 
obtain the control over the firm’s assets with probability one. In transferring the control over a 
distressed firm’s assets to the creditor the courts act perfectly rational in our model. The 
transfer will leave the expected total payoff unchanged and will only change the distribution 
of payoffs. Essentially, the courts enable the bank to obtain the maximum-possible portion of 
her contractual claims. However, as the act of filing requires a commitment from the bank to 
continue the firm, the procedure precludes a bank from a subsequent liquidation. Any attempt 
to liquidate the firm would be observed by the courts and because the potential negative 
effects on the value of specific human capital are publicly known, the alternative 
liquidation/reorganization procedure would be immediately initiated by the courts. Hence, 
only banks that have developed restructuring skills will find it worthwhile to file for the 
restructuring procedure at t=1. 
Because banks of type R=r obtain the control with probability one, the parties may also agree 
on a restructuring without involving the courts at t=1. A private workout through which the 
bank gets in a position to restructure the firm will thus have identical implications on the 
payoffs at t=2. 
 
Both parties can file for the liquidation/reorganization procedure as soon as the firm is 
observed to be in financial distress. However, it is ruled out that the debtor preempt a bank 
willing to restructure. Hence, courts are assumed to prioritize the restructuring procedure over 
the second procedure, which is again consistent with rational behavior in our context. 
In order to account for potential deviations from an absolute priority rule as well as for the 
possibility that failing firms might nevertheless continue their operations, we assume that 
courts empower the bank (or a court-appointed trustee) to liquidate the firm only with 
probability p≤ 1. The value of p is assumed to be public knowledge ex ante. With probability 
(1-p) the control remains with the entrepreneur, who will subsequently select the risky action 
ab and attempt to extract private benefits b. The difference between the contractual repayment 
amount  D and the expected payoff for the bank x+α H-½b can then be interpreted as a 
violation of priority (equivalent to a debt relief in our model) determined by some debtor-
formulated plan for reorganization. Hence, a bankruptcy law that implies a value for p that is 
smaller than 1 provides the entrepreneur with clearly defined opportunities to protect his 
assets - at least partially - from creditor access.  
Since the courts neither observe the exact realization of the signal ~ x  nor the liquidation value 
L+α H of the firm they cannot infer at t=1 whether a liquidation or a continuation would be 
the economically efficient outcome of the liquidation/reorganization procedure. As a 
consequence of this ex post lack of information the determination of p must be, contrary to 
the first clause of the insolvency code, exogenous to our model. The parameter p can thus be 
interpreted as a proxy for the legal orientation or tradition of an economy. The higher the 
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value for p, the more creditor-oriented is the bankruptcy law in force. To draw an analogy to 
the US-American bankruptcy law, p would be the probability that a ”chapter 7”-type 
liquidation procedure is initiated and (1-p) would be the probability for a ”chapter 11”-type 
procedure. 
We further assume that the liquidation/reorganization procedure entails some deadweight loss 
c, encompassing legal and other administrative fees associated with bankruptcy filing and 
opportunity costs from a reduction of the firm’s competitiveness as the attention of the 
entrepreneur is focused on the bankruptcy. It is assumed that the incumbent owner-manager 
remains in control during the legal proceedings and that his financial wealth will at t=1 still 
amount to zero. As a consequence, we shall neglect his share in c and presume that c will be 
entirely borne by the bank, either directly at t=1 or indirectly through a decline of the firm 
value at t=2. It is important to note that c will arise irrespective of the control allocation 
determined by the bankruptcy courts. 
 
2.4 Private  Renegotiations 
In this section we examine whether it may be beneficial for both, the bank and the 
entrepreneur, to enter private renegotiations on a new sharing rule after having observed the 
signal  ~ x  at t=1. The agreement on a new sharing rule must always imply a transfer payment 
from the bank to the entrepreneur or equivalently, a reduction of the nominal credit amount to 
be repaid at t=2. It cannot lead to a transfer payment from the entrepreneur, as he is still 
wealth constrained at t=1 by assumption. 
2.4.1  Renegotiations in the signal interval [D-α H,x ] 
If a signal greater than D-α H occurs, the firm is observed to be financially healthy. The only 
question that has to answered is whether the entrepreneur will prefer action ab over action a0. 
The entrepreneur’s decision obviously depends on his expected payoffs from each alternative. 
If the signal is sufficiently high, that is, if he can expect to receive some payoff after repaying 
the loan in full, the entrepreneur will bear downside potential when selecting the risky action 
ab. However, if the signal is smaller than a crucial value x
a, the bank bears this downside 
potential, whereas the entrepreneur will benefit from the upside potential. x
a  solves the 
equation: x
a+α H-D = ½(x
a+α H-D+b) + ½ max [x
a+α H-D-b, 0]. We obtain: x
a = D+b-α H or 
equivalently π
a=D+b. 
Hence, if the signal value implies a payoff π E from choosing a0 that is smaller than b, the 
entrepreneur acts perfectly rational in selecting action ab. In this case, he will obtain both the 
verifiable payoff x+α H-D and the private benefits b with a probability of ½. With an equal 
probability, the total payoff turns out ”low” and the opportunity losses b will have to be 
primarily borne by the bank. As the action ai is nonverifiable and thus noncontractible, it is 
not possible for the entrepreneur to commit himself ex ante to act in the bank’s interest.
22 
                                                 
22 Because the value of the signal is nonverifiable, the parties are not able to write a contract on the choice of 
action ai. This aspect distinguishes our approach from the one chosen by Aghion/Bolton (1992), where the 
control over the firm’s assets shifts contingent upon a signal’s value. Berglöf (1994) applies a mechanism that 
is quite similar to the one presented here. 
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Selecting ab does of course reduce the expected payoff π B to the bank. Whereas the riskless 
action  a0 implies the payoff min[D,π ], the bank can then only reckon with the amount 
min[D,π CASH]. Our model thus encompasses a moral hazard problem for signal values x 
smaller than D+b-α H. 
The question arises whether private renegotiations can solve this moral hazard problem. In 
order to induce the entrepreneur to choose a0, the bank would have to offer a transfer payment 
s. Any payment s has to be contingent upon the verifiable total payoff at t=2. Otherwise, the 
entrepreneur would capture s and nevertheless select ab, as this action is not observable by 
third parties. 
As a consequence, the entrepreneur would receive the payment s with probability ½, even if 
he had selected the risky action ab. The reason is simple: With probability ½ the action ab will 
yield the same verifiable payoff as a0. From the entrepreneur’s perspective, s therefore has to 
satisfy the condition π -D+s ≥  ½(b+π -D+s) ⇔  s ≥  (D+b)-π . The bank, on the other hand, is 
only willing to pay that amount if D-[(D+b)-π ] ≥  ½(D+π -b) ⇔  π  ≥  D+b holds. 
We conclude that a bank will never consider a transfer payment as a means of avoiding the 
risky action in the signal interval x∈ [D-α H, D-α H+b]. The entrepreneur will hence always 
select ab. If a signal greater than D-α H+b occurs, a bank would actually prefer to pay s. 
However, since the entrepreneur’s threat to select ab is not credible, transfer payments are not 
necessary and will thus not occur in the interval x∈ [D-α H+b, x ], either. 
Yet another result that can be obtained for this interval is that the selection of the action ai is 
neither influenced by the type of the bankruptcy law nor by the bank’s ex ante decision 
concerning R. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of this section: 
  Signal D-α
·H              D-α ·H+b  x
 Action  ab a 0 
 Total  Payoff  π   x+α H+½(b-b)   x+α H 
 Payoff  Bank  π B  ½(x+α H+D-b)  D 
  Comments  no transfer payment,  
debtor remains in control 
no transfer payment 
Table 2: Payoffs in the signal interval [D-α H, x ] 
 
2.4.2  Renegotiations in the signal interval [0,D-α H] 
The firm is observed to be financially distressed if a signal x<D-α H occurs. The bankruptcy 
law that is in force will thus serve as the outside option for the two parties and its attributes – 
represented by the two parameters p and c – become crucial determinants of the distribution 
of bargaining power in t=1. In this section we analyze whether and to what extent the two 
parties are able to achieve a private workout on how to proceed, i.e. which action ai to select. 
Let us again start by examining whether it is worthwhile for the bank to offer a transfer 
payment to the entrepreneur in order to make him select a0. From the last section we know 
that the entrepreneur strictly prefers the risky action whenever x+α H<D+b is true, because 
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he can appropriate the private benefit b with a probability of ½. A transfer payment that 
would induce the debtor to act in the bank’s interest thus had to solve s=½(b+s) ⇔  s=b. As 
this amount clearly exceeds the bank’s marginal payoff ½b that would result from selecting a0 
instead of ab, we are able to establish that bribing a financially distressed entrepreneur to 
select a0 does not constitute a viable option for the bank. 
Secondly, we have to clarify whether a bank of type R=r would bribe the entrepreneur to 
transfer the control in order to restructure the firm. The answer to this question is again 
negative. A bank willing to restructure is always granted the control by the courts, as this will 
strictly increase the chances that the loan is repaid in full. Hence, no transfer payment is 
required. 
Finally, we shall elaborate on the question whether our model encompasses constellations in 
which a bank pays an amount s to the entrepreneur so that he, in turn, would concede to an 
immediate liquidation. It should be clear that the entrepreneur will never liquidate voluntarily, 
i.e. without any compensation, as this would lead to a sure loss of H and would preclude him 
from extracting private benefits. The debtor thus faces a “[...]tradeoff between firm value and 
his personal well-being at the expense of the firm’s claimholders”.
23 
If the prevailing bankruptcy law is not too creditor-oriented, the bank has in principle 
incentives to offer a transfer payment that is smaller than the sum of the legal costs c and the 
anticipated dilution of the firm‘s value should the entrepreneur remain in control. Again, the 
impossibility of a binding private commitment precludes such an alternative. Irrespective of 
the payment amount, the debtor cannot credibly commit himself to refrain from seeking court 
protection after having received the payment, as filing for the liquidation/reorganization 
procedure would lead to an incremental payoff amounting to (1-p)(H+½b). 
We conclude that transfer payments will not occur for signals smaller than D-α H. Rather, 
given that a liquidation attempt is not worthwhile, a bank of type R=0 will always remain 
passive and will thereby implicitly accept a partial debt relief as the entrepreneur is given the 
opportunity to seize private benefits. A bank of type R=r will always conduct a restructuring 
of the firm. We shall interpret this results as the potential outcomes of a private workout 
between a distressed firm and its creditor in our model. 
 
2.5  Derivation of equilibrium strategies 
In this section we will utilize the results of the previous sections to derive the two parties’ 
payoffs as a function of the two choice variables H (investment into firm-specific human 
capital) and R (investment into restructuring skills), and the vector θ   comprising all 
parameters values. The optimization problem reads as follows: 
(1)  ∫
x
E dx x R H D
x 0
) , , ˆ , ˆ , (
1
max θ π  
                                                 
23 See Wruck (1990), p. 440. 
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(2)  ∫ = +
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) , , ˆ , ˆ , (
1 ˆ θ π  
(3)  ∫
x
B dx x R H D R
0
) , , , ˆ , (
x
1
argmax   ˆ θ π  
(4)  ∫
x
E dx x R H D H
0
) , , ˆ , , (
x
1
argmax   ˆ θ π  
π E symbolizes the entrepreneur’s ex post payoff and π B that of the bank. The distribution of the 
total payoff π  depends on the allocation of control that prevails at the beginning of the second 
period, which itself is a function of the signal x. As a consequence, each party can ex ante 
determine her expected payoff by summing over the weighted payoffs that she will be able to 
capture in each of the possible states. In order to solve for the equilibrium strategy vector (R*, 
H*) we thus need to find the boundaries of the signal intervals and the sharing rules that get 
applied within these boundaries. 
A ”direct” search for the pair of strategies that maximizes the project’s total payoff would in a 
first step require to find the repayment amount D that solves the bank’s participation 
constraint (2) and in a second step require to enter the resulting term into the entrepreneur’s 
profit-function (1). The values for R and H that maximize function (1) would then represent 
the equilibrium strategies. This approach, however, leads to overly extensive expressions that 
do not allow for a closed form solution and can only be solved numerically.
24 For that reason, 
we shall pursue an alternative, ”indirect”, approach, that brings with it the helpful implication 
that the nominal debt amount D does not have to be considered explicitly. Instead of 
comparing the project returns implied by particular strategy vectors we will focus on the 
deviations of these very returns from the first-best return implied by complete contracts. The 
particular strategy-vector that leads to the smallest deviation and at the same time satisfies the 
incentive compatibility constraint will then be the one that yields the highest expected return. 
The reason why this ”indirect” approach enables us to avoid an explicit treatment of the 
contractual repayment amount D is straightforward: In our model, inefficiencies are the result 
of ex ante liquidation probabilities that differ from the first-best. Different repayment 
amounts, however, do not imply different liquidation probabilities. D merely determines the 
ex ante probability that the entrepreneur will select the risky action ai at t=1 (the crucial signal 
value xa was shown to be a function of D). However, as selecting ai will only modify the 
sharing rule, the total ex post payoffs and hence the ex ante return will remain unchanged. In 
comparing the inefficiencies brought about by different strategy vectors, we can thus confine 
our analysis to those signal intervals, in which a liquidation may occur and whose boundaries 
are unaffected by D.
 25 
                                                 
24 See Hackethal/Tyrell (1997), who present a numerical solution for an extended model. 
25 The exact value of D is only relevant in those circumstances, where the profitability of the project, measured 
by the ratio of x  and I, is very low. Should the bank require a repayment amount D that exceeds the largest 
potential ex post payoff x +α H, financing constraints will be binding. In Appendix 2, we demonstrate that the 
severity of such constraints depend on the bank’s type R. 
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A second implication from the irrelevance of D concerns the selection of payoff functions that 
we shall compare. In maximizing his expected return from the project, the entrepreneur will 
ex ante offer a repayment amount D that implies an expected profit of zero to the bank and 
that simultaneously satisfies her incentive compatibility constraint with respect to R (refer to 
Appendix 1 for a proof). The strategy vector that maximizes the entrepreneur’s profit must 
then also maximize the total profit of the project. As a consequence of this identity, we will 
henceforth only examine the payoff functions of the entrepreneur and neglect those of the 
bank. 
 
We continue by examining the first-best-case, in which the exact value of the signal is 
assumed to be verifiable. What is the maximal value of the signal that will still lead to an 
efficient liquidation of the firm? As the expected payoffs from continuing the firm’s 
operations and from a liquidation are x+α ·H and L+α ·H-H, respectively, both parties will ex 
ante always agree to liquidate, if the signal turns out be smaller than L-H. The ex ante 
probability of a liquidation in a world of complete contracts hence amounts to (L-H)/ x . Table 
3 indicates the actions that the entrepreneur will select depending on the realization of the 
signal ~ x . There is only one equilibrium in this setting, namely (H=h, R=0).
26 
  Signal                0                                        x*=L-h  x  
 Action  aL  a0  
 Total  payoff  π   L+α H-H  x+α ·H  
Table 3: First-best signal intervals and actions 
As mentioned above the attributes of the first-best outcome will in the subsequent sections 
serve as a ”benchmark” for examining the efficiency related properties of second-best 
strategy vectors. 
Because the deterministic portion α ·H of the total pay-off π  does arise irrespective of the 
action selected at t=1, it has no further implications on the interval boundaries.
27 We will thus 
neglect this term in deriving the boundaries and will only reconsider it when discussing 
anticipated total payoffs. 
 
2.5.1  Banks that are able to restructure the firm in financial distress 
In this section we analyze the case, in which the bank has invested into her capability to 
restructure the firm in financial distress (R=r, H). As noted earlier, for signals indicating 
financial health of the firm, the entrepreneur’s choice of an action ai does not depend on the 
bank’s choice regarding r, so that the bank’s strategy will not have an influence on the 
payoffs in the interval [D-α ·H,  x ]. However, if the firm falls into financial distress, the bank 
has, in principle, always incentives to seize control over the firm’s assets because her 
                                                 
26 Implicitly, we thus assume that α ·h>h·(L-h)/x  ⇔  α >(L-h)/ x  is true. Hence, investing in specific human 
capital is in principle desirable from a society’s perspective in our model. 
27 We only have to consider this term when comparing total payoffs π =x+α H to the contractual repayment 
amount D, which does not feature the payoff α H explicitly (see section 2.4 and Appendix 1). 
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marginal payoff from restructuring amounts to ½b. In these situations her ability to restructure 
becomes critical. Apart from restructuring she may also select a second alternative, i.e. 
liquidating the firm. Hence, we need to find the critical signal value, below which a bank 
capable of restructuring attempts to liquidate the firm. 
Restructuring will yield the payoff π B=π =x+α H. As assumed, seeking a liquidation will be 
successful with probability p and then lead to the full liquidation payoff π B=L+α H. With 
probability (1-p), however, the entrepreneur will remain in control, select the risky action ab 
and reduce the bank’s expected payoff to x+α H-½b. As was also assumed, filing for a 
liquidation/reorganization procedure will inevitably cause a dead-weight loss c for the bank. 
Thus, the critical signal value xL
R=r can be obtained from solving xL
R=r = pL+(1-p)(xL
R=r-½b)-c ⇔  
xL
R=r=L-((1-p)½b+c)/p. If the parameter values L, p, b, and c imply a positive value for xL
R=r, we 
have to distinguish two intervals. 
  Signal   0    xL
R=r=L-((1-p)½b+c)/p D-α ·H
 Action  Prob(a=aL)=p       Prob(a= ab)=(1-p)  ab 
 Total  Payoff*  p(L-H)+(1-p)x-c+α H  x+α H 
 Payoff  Bank  p·L+(1-p)(x-½b)-c+α H  x+α H 
  Comment  bank prefers liquidation  bank prefers restructuring 
Table 4: Payoffs from (r,H) and xL
R=r>0 
In all other cases, in which p<(2c+b)/(2L+b) holds and hence xL
R=r is either zero or negative, it 
would never be optimal for the bank to attempt a liquidation. In these circumstances, we can 
thus confine our analysis to one interval in which the bank will restructure the firm, ”save” 
the firm-specific human capital and obtain a payoff π B equal to x+α H. 
In referring to these interval boundaries and to the actions selected in between we will later be 
able to derive the inefficiencies induced by the strategy combinations (r,h) and (r,0), 
respectively.  
 
2.5.2  Banks that are not able to restructure the firm in financial distress 
Remember, that a bank of type R=0 lacks the firm-specific information necessary to prevent 
the entrepreneur from diverting private benefits in period two. As a consequence, when 
financial distress is observed the bank may only choose between either remaining passive, 
thus tolerating the expropriation of private benefits, or attempting a liquidation which will 
entail the cost c and will have a success probability equal to p. We proceed in analogy to the 
previous section and compare the bank’s payoffs from the two alternatives. We obtain pL+(1-
p)(xL-½b)=(xL
 R=0-½b) ⇒ xL
R=0=L+½b-c/p. If the parameter values lead to xL
R=0>0 we obtain the 
following interval boundaries. 
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  Signal  0                                        x
R=0
L=L+½b-c/p D-α ·H
 Action  Prob(a=aL)=p       Prob(a= ab)=(1-p)  ab 
 Payoff  Bank  p·L+(1-p)(x+α H-½b)-c  x+α H-½b 
  Comment  bank prefers liquidation  bank remains passive 
Table 5: Payoffs from (0,H) and xL
R=0>0 
The analysis is again simplified if the parameter values lead to a negative boundary xL
R=0. For 
that to be the case the inequality p<2c/(2L+b) must hold. 
If one compares these results with the ones that were obtained for a bank of type R=r, two 
conclusions can be drawn immediately: Firstly, as xL
R=r<xL
R=0 will always hold, financing 
arrangements that involve a bank with restructuring skills c.p. lead to a lower ex ante 
liquidation probability. Secondly, because (2c+b)/(2L+b) is greater than 2c/(2L+b), a bank of 
type  R=0 will attempt a liquidation for smaller values of p than a bank of type R=r. 
Combined, these results imply that the bank’s restructuring skills serve as an ex ante 
protection of firm-specific human capital. 
In Appendix 2 we will build on this insight and show that, given the bank’s incentive-
compatibility constraint is satisfied, investing r will lead to a reduction of the contractual 
repayment amount D and may thus avoid credit rationing. 
A purely technical consequence of the necessity to differentiate between specific parameter 
constellations is that we have to separately examine the payoff functions on three 
complementary subdomains. We obtain the three cases defined below.
28 
Case 1  p≥ (2c+b)/(2L+b)  xL
R=r>0  xL
R=0>0 
Case 2  2c/(2L+b)<p<(2c+b)/(2L+b)  xL
R=r≤ 0  xL
R=0>0 
Case 3  p≤ 2c/(2L+b)  xL
R=r<0  xL
R=0≤ 0 
Table 6: Definition of cases 1, 2, and 3 
2.5.3 The  payoff-function 
In this section we will examine the inefficiencies implied by the four strategy vectors (r,h), 
(r,0), (0,h) and (0,0) relative to the first-best case of complete contracts. We will also show 
that we can indeed confine our analysis to the two extreme choices H=0 and H=h, because all 
other values for H turn out to be suboptimal. 
Through an ad-hoc comparison of the four strategy vectors to the first-best strategy (0,h), we 
can already establish that vectors with R=r entail inefficiencies amounting to at least r and 
vectors with H=0 definitely entail inefficiencies from underinvesting in firm-specific human 
capital. All other potential efficiency losses are primarily caused by suboptimal interval 
boundaries and hence suboptimal ex ante liquidation probabilities. 
                                                 
28 We express the three conditions in terms of the parameter p, as this allows us to refer to the cases as 
circumscribing constellations that involve a particular category of bankruptcy laws. 
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The first-best case involves only one critical signal value, namely x*=L-h. Signals larger than 
or equal to x* imply a total payoff equal to x+α h, whereas signals smaller than x* lead to a 
total payoff equal to L+α h-h. The expected first-best total payoff thus amounts to: 







LhLh x Lh x Lh h α  
The terms inside the square brackets in (5) represent the average payoffs in the two intervals 
weighted by the length of the respective interval. As the payoff-function is linear in x for 
x>x*, the expected payoff from continuing the firm is calculated by averaging over the 
respective payoffs on the upper and lower boundaries of this interval. 
As was shown in the previous sections, the existence of incomplete contracts assigns an 
important role to the parameters c and p in determining the value of the critical signals. From 
Tables 3 to 5 we can infer that all second-best critical signal values are strictly smaller than 
L+b/2. Because all strategy vectors yield identical payoffs for signals greater than L+b/2, we 
can use this insight to simplify our analysis considerably, namely by confining our analysis to 
the interval [0, L+b/2]. Applied to function (5) this translates into replacing the parameter x  
inside the parentheses by the term L+b/2. 
The two payoff functions for R=r and R=0 are constructed analogously to function (5). Their 
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The payoff functions for the cases 2 and 3 can be easily derived from (6) and (7) through 
replacing xL
R=0 and/or xL
R=r by zero. For case 3, where p carries a relatively small value, it 
becomes immediately apparent that the two strategy vectors (r,H) are c.p. strictly dominated 
by the respective strategy vectors (0,H): The payoff functions are identical except for the 
nonnegative cost r, which is caused by the bank’s strategy R=r. 
As noted earlier, we will solve the financing problem by comparing the efficiency losses that 
are incurred depending on the strategies chosen. For that purpose we shall now translate the 
two payoff functions from above into inefficiency functions, which we will denote by φ
R,H. 
This is done by subtracting each of the second-best payoff functions (6) and (7) from the first-
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Both functions are linear in H, so that their global minima can only lie exactly on the border 
of H’s domain. Hence, either H=0 or H=h will minimize the efficiency losses. At t=0 a 
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rational entrepreneur will thus either invest the maximal amount possible into firm-specific 
human capital or solely build up non-specific human capital. As a consequence of the 
linearity, only four strategy vectors need to be compared, i.e. those four vectors that were 
mentioned at the beginning of this section. 
 
2.5.4  The Concept of Complementarity 
It is not the primary goal of this paper to find parameter values and strategy vectors that 
maximize social welfare and then derive normative statements as to how the concerned 
elements of a financial system – especially the bankruptcy law in force - should be optimally 
configured. Rather, we want to prove that there exist complementary relationships among the 
endogenous variables as well as between these variables and the parameters. A natural 
extension of our model would be to make some of the parameters endogenous, e.g. by 
introducing a third party (a legislative body), that at t= -1 chooses her strategy regarding e.g. 
the orientation of the bankruptcy law (p,  c) or the reporting requirements for financial 
information (thus affecting the entrepreneur’s opportunities (b) to appropriate private 
benefits). Such an extended model could then contribute to the current debate as to what 
specific configuration of a financial system is the most efficient. 
The goal of this paper is much more modest, though, as we believe, also of great importance. 
We establish how firms and investors will optimally solve a financing problem given a 
specific legal environment. More importantly, we show that because the relationship between 
the variables and the parameters is characterized by complementarity a ”middle-of-the-road” 
strategy of the third party regarding the legal environment will not lead to the optimal 
outcome. That is, in establishing or modifying single elements of that environment the 
properties of other elements have to be considered. Modifying one element into a specific 
”direction” means that changing the other elements into the same ”direction” will improve the 
overall solution to the financing problem. Rather than highlighting the optimal properties of 
elements that constitute an ideal financial system, we identify one optimal property of all 
”good” financial systems, namely that its elements ”fit together”. 
 
The notion of complementarity as it will be used in this context dates back to the work of 
Edgeworth. He defines two activities as complements, if and only if increasing the level of 
any one activity leads to a higher marginal return from increasing the level of the other. In the 
case of continuously differentiable functions this corresponds to positive mixed-partial 
derivatives of the objective function.  
However, if one analyzes functions with discrete variables a generalization of Edgeworth’s 
concept is needed. As will become clear in this section, a branch of mathematics known as 
lattice theory lends itself perfectly for this purpose. Its application allows us to abandon the 
conditions concerning the divisibility of choice variables and the smoothness of payoff 
functions. 
Formally a lattice (A, ≥ ) is defined as a set A of vectors with a partial order ≥ . The set must 
contain both the supremum and the infimum of all possible pairs of its elements. That is, for 
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any elements x and y, the set must contain a smallest element under the order that is larger 
than x and y as well as a largest element that is smaller than both.
29 
The Euclidean plane R
2 satisfies this condition, as does the set G in Exhibit 2, which itself 
represents a sublattice of R
2. Both the infimum inf(a,b)=(x1,y1) and the supremum 
sup(a,b)=(x2,y2) of the elements a=(x1,y2) and b=(x2,y1) belong to the set G.
30 So do the 
infimum and supremum of any other pair of elements in G. Hence, the boundaries of a lattice 
must not involve any ”downward-sloping” portions. For this very reason the set H does not 
constitute a lattice. It contains the elements a and b, but 
does not include their infimum. If H delineated the 
 space of some decision maker its particular shape 
mply that even though the decision maker can set 
the activity levels of x and y in order to arrive at the 
strategies  a and b, he is precluded from combining the 
lower activity levels in order to achieve the strategy 
inf(a,b). More generally, increasing (decreasing) one 
variable must not rule out the possibility of increasing 
(decreasing) or keeping constant any of the other variables. 
strategy
would i
Applied to our model, we establish that the set S 
consisting of all vectors of choice variables (R,H) and all vectors θ  with components θ i equal 
to the values of the parameters b, h, p, I, α , 1/L, 1/r, 1/c, 1/ x  does constitute a lattice.
31 
Increasing (decreasing) any one parameter or variable, i.e. any component of the vectors in S, 
does not necessitate the reduction (increase) of any other parameter or variable. Rather, the 
values of the parameters can be selected independently and no restrictions apply to the 
determination of the optimal values of the two choice variables. Increasing the initial 
investment I for instance does neither, in principle, preclude the entrepreneur from investing 
in specific human capital nor does it add constrains on the domain of the parameter b, i.e. the 
private benefits that can potentially be extracted by the entrepreneur once the project was 
started. The requirement that S be a lattice serves as a precondition for the analysis of 






Exhibit 1: The sublattice G 
In general, arguments of a function f(⋅ ) are complements and the function is called 
supermodular if the following condition holds: 
f(sup(a,b)) - f(a) ≥  f(b) - f(inf(a,b)). 
The inequality can be interpreted as follows: Increasing the component x of a vector (x,y) if at 
the same time the component y is assigned a high value has an effect on the value of the 
function f(⋅ ) that must not be smaller than the effect from increasing x if y is set low.
32 Exhibit 
                                                 
29 The methodological remarks on complementarity are to a large part adopted from Milgrom/Roberts (1995). 
Literature on extensions of the theory and on recent applications can be found there. For an extensive 
treatment of lattice theory and supermodularity see Topkis (1998). 
30 sup(a,b) and inf(a,b) can also be expressed by a ∧  b and a ∨  b, respectively. 
31 As we will later demonstrate, the maximizers for R and H are nondecreasing in the inverse values of r, c, L 
and  x  on specific sublattices of S. In order to establish complementarity between the vectors (R, H) and θ , 
the latter must contain the inverse values of these four parameters. 
32 As can be easily verified, complementarity is a symmetric concept. The marginal return from increasing y is 
also larger (or at least equally large) if x is assigned a higher value. 
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2 depicts a function that fulfills this condition. Moving from the activity levels of x and y 
implied by the infimum of the vectors a and b to the levels implied by vector b yields a 
smaller marginal return - which in this case is even negative - than a move from vector a to 
the supremum of a and b. 
What are the implications of complementarity and supermodularity, respectively? It was 
shown that changing the values of complementary arguments into the same direction always 
weakly dominates a modification in opposite directions. A decision maker, who does not 
know the exact expression of his objective function but does know that his objective function 
is supermodular is thereby able to constrain 
his strategy space considerably without 
having to fear that he will accidentally 
expel the optimal strategy vector.
33 To 
clarify this point, let us assume that the 
decision maker starts in point c=(1,1) in 
Exhibit 2. His strategy set contains exactly 
24 alternatives, excluding the status quo. 
Knowing that f(x,y) is supermodular, he can 
ignore 6 of them because they imply 
modifying  x and y in opposite directions 
and thus would not increase his return. If 
b=(3,0) was his starting point, the number 
of potentially successful alternatives would 
be reduced even further; it would be halved 
to 12. Hence, one general implication of complementarity is that if none of the vectors lying 
on one of the relevant orthants leads to a higher return than the status quo no other vector on 





















Exhibit 2: A supermodular function: f(x,y) 
A second implication of complementarity concerns strategic games with multiple players. If, 
for instance, the objective functions of two players are supermodular with respect to their own 
strategies and the marginal returns are nondecreasing in the rival’s strategy, then the best-
response correspondences exhibit positive slopes and there exists at least one pure-strategy 
Nash-equilibrium. The players’ strategies are then called strategic complements.
34 If multiple 
Nash-equilibria occur, the set of all Nash-equilibrium strategies always contain a smallest and 
a greatest strategy vector under the order ≥ . 
A little example shall shed some more light on this: Let us assume that two players R and H 
participate in a strictly supermodular game. R can choose his strategy to be either 0 or r and 
H can choose between 0 and h, where both r and h are greater than zero. The strategy vectors 
(0,h) and (r,0) can then never be the only two elements of the Nash-equilibrium set. 
Furthermore, as the best-response correspondences are increasing, the equilibrium-set can 
                                                 
33 For a discussion of possible deviations from the global maximum, see Milgrom/Roberts (1995), p.185. 
However, inefficiencies can only occur if complementarities are zero and an unfavorable starting point is 
chosen. 
34 See Fudenberg/Tirole (1991), p.489. 
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never contain the following pairs of strategy vectors {(0,h);(0,0)}, {(r,0);(r,h)}, {(0,h);(r,h)} 
and {(0,0),(r,0)}, respectively. Otherwise, one player would have to be indifferent regarding 
his choice which, in turn, would not be compatible with increasing response correspondences. 
A second consequence of this property is that the equilibrium set will never contain more than 
two elements. Hence, only the five sets {(0,0)}, {(0,h)}, {(r,0)}, {(r,h)}, and {(0,0);(r,h)} 
remain as potential Nash-equilibrium sets and supermodularity implies that only the two 
strategy vectors in which both players choose either the upper bound or the lower bound of 
their strategy sets can coexist in the Nash-equilibrium set. 
A third helpful implication arises if the objective function is supermodular with respect to the 
vectors of choice variables and to the vectors of parameters θ . In that case, the Nash-
equilibrium set can itself be treated as a nondecreasing 
function in θ .
35 The implications on our simple example 
are straightforward: When starting from the equilibrium 
set {(0,0)}, any stepwise increase of the parameter values 
can only lead through the paths of equilibrium sets 
depicted in Exhibit 3. If {(0,0);(r,h)} is the status quo, we 
can infer from the supermodularity property that any 
increase in θ  will never expel the vector (r,h) from the 
equilibrium set. However, if the increase is sufficiently 
large the players will no longer choose the zero-strategies. 
More generally, the choice variables tend to increase or 








Exhibit 3: Equilibrium sets as a 
      function of θ  
A final remark concerns the strength of complementarity between choice variables. In our 
example the probability with which (r,0) and (0,h) become elements of the equilibrium set is 
inversely related to the players’ marginal returns from simultaneously choosing the non zero-
strategies. The larger these marginal returns and thus the stronger the complementarities, the 
smaller will be the necessary increase in θ  to shift the equilibrium set from {(0,0)} directly to 
{(r,h)}. 
In summarizing, far reaching statements concerning the existence and the structure of 
equilibrium strategies can be made if the objective function in question is supermodular. 
Complementary choice variables imply that at least one pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium 
exists. Complementarity between choice variables and parameters implies that a monotone 
modification of the parameters leads to predictable modifications of the set of Nash-
equilibria. 
 
2.5.5 Complementarity  between the choice variables H and R 
In order to prove that the two choice variables R and H are strategic complements in our 
model, we need to show that the objective function Π (·) is supermodular with respect to these 
                                                 
35 According to Milgrom/Roberts (1995, FN.3), it is sufficient to prove that there exists a complementary 
relationship between all the choice variables and each single parameter. Then, the relationship among the 
parameters does not have to be analyzed any further. 
   24
variables. The relevant sublattice consists of the four vectors: (r, h; θ ), (r, 0; θ ), (0, h; θ ), and 















Exhibit 4: Supermodularity of the objective function Π (·) 
For the supermodularity condition to be satisfied, a shift from R=0 to R=r must lead to a 
higher marginal return if H is set to h than if H is set to zero. Exhibit 4 visualizes this 
condition: The marginal return depicted by distance C must be larger than the distance A, 
which is negative in the example above. Since complementarity is a symmetric concept, this 
must translate into distance B being smaller (again, the marginal return and hence B is 
negative in our example) than distance D: Investing in specific human capital thus yields a 
higher marginal return if the bank simultaneously decides to acquire restructuring skills. 











0,h), must be 
nonnegative. Depending on the constellation of parameter values (cases j=1,2,3) we have to 
analyze three different sets Sj. The following expressions are obtained for κ j
R,H(·): 
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It is obvious from (10) and (11) that R and H are strategic complements on the sublattices 
implied by cases 1 and 2.
36 If θ  falls into case 3 a situation occurs in which the distances A 
and C in Exhibit 4 would be identical: Investing in specific human capital does not affect the 
incentives to build up restructuring skills. This result still satisfies the conditions of weak 
complementarity and should come at no surprise. In case 3, the bank will never attempt a 
liquidation, so that the firm’s specific human capital will under no circumstances become 
                                                 
36 All parameters are defined to be nonnegative. Simple algebra shows that if the conditions implied by case 2 
are satisfied by the parameters, the negative sign of the parameter c can never lead to a negative value of κ 2
R,H. 
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worthless. Hence, the banks’ reorganization skills, which in other cases serve as a socially 
desirable device to protect specific human capital, will only affect the ex post sharing rule. 
We conclude that an investment in human capital provides nonnegative incentives to invest in 
restructuring skills. In the cases 1 and 2, those incentives increase in b, h and 1/ x . In case 2 
they also increase in p and 1/c. Better opportunities to extract private benefits, technologies 
that qualify for higher inputs of specific human capital, less profitable investment projects and 
stronger creditor rights provided by the bankruptcy law in force thus tend to increase the 
degree of complementarity between R and H. 
As was mentioned in the previous section, a higher degree of complementarity corresponds to 
a lower probability for the strategy vectors (0,h) and (r,0) to qualify as equilibrium strategies. 
 
2.5.6 Complementarity  between the choice variable R and the parameters θ  
After we have shown that the choice variables R and H are strategic complements and that the 
degree of their complementarity is a monotone function of parameter values we shall now 
demonstrate that the relation between the choice variable R and the parameters θ  is also 
characterized by complementarity. 
For this purpose we have to analyze the two sublattices for H=0 and H=h separately. A 
second modification to our approach from the previous section is due to the fact that the 
objective function is continuously differentiable in all the parameters. Hence, the function 
κ j




0,H)/∂θ i ⇔  κ j
R,θ i(·)=∂ (φ
0,H-φ
r,H)/∂θ i, where θ i symbolizes a specific parameter 
and H can take on either the value zero or h. If κ j
R,θ i is positive we can infer that increasing 
the value of parameter i will increase the marginal return from investing in restructuring 
skills. Again we visualize this condition. Exhibit 5 depicts a complementary relation between 















Exhibit 5: Complementarity between R and b 
We proceed by examining the marginal return function for the three cases. Case 3 is again 
trivial, because liquidation will not occur and restructuring skills do not bring about any 
efficiency gains. 
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(15)  Case 3 (S3):    r





The first obvious result concerns the relationship between the bank’s decision to invest in 
restructuring skills (R) and the costs (r) that she will thereby incur. It should come at no 
surprise that κ j
R,1/r is positive for j=1,2, and 3, so that the incentives to invest decrease with 
the related costs. R and 1/r are thus complements. 
κ j
R,h(·)
 and κ j
R,1/x(·) are also nonnegative on the entire lattice S. A higher upper bound h for 
the investment in human capital and a lower profitability 1/ x  of the project therefore never 
decrease the incentives to invest in R. 
The effects of b, p and c, however, are not unambiguous on the domains S1 and S2 of the 
objective function. Whereas κ 2
R,b(·) is always nonnegative, the sign of κ 1
R,b(·) depends on the 
values of the parameters h and b and of the choice variable H. R and b are complements if the 
inequality  p>½b/(h+b) holds. Thus p>½ provides a sufficient condition to establish 
complementarity between b and R on S1. 
κ 1
R,p(·) and κ 1
R,1/c(·)=0 are both nonnegative. However, the signs of κ 2
R,1/c(·) and κ 2
R,p(·) 
depend on the values of the arguments H, h, b, L, so that complementarity between R on the 
one hand and the parameters that circumscribe the bankruptcy law on the other hand can be 
established on the entire domain S1 but only on specific sublattices of S2. The same applies to 
1/L, the inverse of the basic payoff from a liquidation: Only if L>c/2p is satisfied on S2, a 
reduction in the liquidation value will increase the incentives to invest in R. 
In conclusion, complementarity between the choice variable R and the parameters θ  cannot be 
observed on the entire lattice S. However, we have also demonstrated that there exist 
sublattices of S where the objective function is indeed supermodular with respect to R and the 
components of θ . A simplified and somewhat heuristic approach to derive such a sublattice is 
to express the various conditions on the parameters from above in terms of one particular 
parameter and then formulate sufficient constraints on it. A natural candidate for this purpose 
is p which was already chosen to distinguish the cases 1 to 3 and hence to delineate the 
corresponding domains S1,  S2, and S3. Requiring p to exceed (2c+b)/(2L+b) and hence 
restricting the analysis on sublattices of S1 leads to complementarity between the choice 
variable R and all parameters except b. A sufficient condition to extend complementarity onto 
b is provided by p>½. Requiring p to satisfy both conditions then yields sublattice on which 
the objective function is supermodular with respect to all its arguments R and θ . We denote 
such sublattices by S
R,θ . 
Are the parameter constraints implied by S
R,θ  plausible? We believe that they are: A 
bankruptcy law that - in case a debtor defaults on a loan - confers the control over the debtors’ 
assets to the creditor with an ex ante probability of less than ½ is hard to imagine. Given p>½, 
the other condition is no longer binding if L exceeds 2c+½b. That the ex ante liquidation 
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value exceeds twice the cost of the legal proceedings plus half of the potential private benefits 
should also stand the test of most real-world applications. 
For situations that are characterized by parameter constellations implied by S
R,θ  we can thus 
establish that a bank’s incentives to invest in restructuring skills increase (or at least do not 
decrease) with better opportunities to extract private benefits (b), technologies that allow for a 
higher input of specific human capital (h), projects with lower expected payoffs (1/x ) and the 
creditor orientation (p,1/c) of the bankruptcy law in force. 
 
2.5.7 Complementarity  between the choice variable H and the parameters θ  
Again, we have to subdivide the lattice S into two sublattices. SR=r is relevant if R is set to r 
and SR=0 is relevant if R is set to zero, respectively. In a second analogy to the last section, the 
expression of κ
H,i(·) differs with respect to the parameter constellation. The only slight 
modification concerns the definition of the three cases in Table 6. Remember that we had to 
discriminate between three cases because the crucial signal value that will induce a bank to 
switch between a debtor-friendly behavior and a liquidation attempt differs with respect to the 
bank’s ex ante strategy. Now that we separately test for supermodularity on the sublattices 
SR=r and SR=0, a subdivision in three cases is no longer required. Rather, if we compare the 
payoffs from the strategies H=h and H=0 on either SR=r or SR=0, we only have to consider the 
efficiency losses that are brought about by xL
R=r and xL
R=0, respectively. Hence the number of 
cases to be distinguished decreases from 3 to 2. As the remaining two cases cover sublattices 
that are different from those delineated by the original cases, we shall denote them by case I 
and case II: 
(16)  Case I ( [SR=r∧ S1] ∨  [SR=0∧  (S1∨ S2)] ): 
() ()  
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The analysis of case II is trivial and the results concerning complementarities are 
straightforward. The value of p is so small that it would not be worthwhile for a bank to make 
a liquidation attempt and, as a consequence, the debtor does not have to fear that the specific 
human capital will become worthless. He has maximum incentives to select the strategy H=h. 
Hence, H is a complement to both α  and h, irrespective of R.  
The much more interesting case is case I, which, if p>½ is also satisfied, covers S
R,θ , i.e. 
sublattices of S on which R and θ  are complements. 
To begin with, it is important to note, that the marginal return from switching from H=0 to 
H=h is positive only if the last term inside the parentheses (p(L+½b) / x ) does not exceed the 
sum of the first two terms (α  and (c+sign(R)½b)/x ). As a consequence, increasing the values 
of the parameters p and 1/c will lead to an opposite effect on H as increasing those of α  and 
1/L. h and b, though, do not have such unambiguous effects on the marginal return. That is, h 
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does only affect its absolute value, but not its sign. κ I
H,b(·) is nonnegative if the bank has 
invested in restructuring skills, but turns negative, if the bank has not. Note that on S
R,θ  the 
bank’s decision to invest in R is itself positively affected by an increase in b. The parameter b, 
that prescribes the intensity of the moral-hazard problem within our model, thus carries a 
pivotal role in the determination of the optimal choices of the two players. To shed some 
more light on this role, let us assume that a particular parameter constellation (satisfying p>½) 
leads to (R=0,H=0) as the only equilibrium strategy. The parameter b could in such a situation 
be crudely interpreted as too small to induce the bank to invest in R. Increasing c.p. b will 
have positive implications on R and negative implications on H until, eventually, b will be 
large enough to cause the bank to switch her strategy. At this particular point, the marginal 
return from investing H=h will be raised by ½bh/x  and any further increases in b will have a 
positive effect on the firm’s incentives as both choice variables are now complements of b. 
Let us return to the unambiguous effects of p, 1/c, 1/L and α : Both, κ I
H,p and κ I
H,1/c are strictly 
negative. Intuition suggests that this actually has to be the case: Increasing p and/or 1/c and 
thus augmenting the creditor-orientation of the bankruptcy law leads to a higher ex ante 
probability that the bank, be it of type R=r or R=0, will attempt a liquidation of the firm ex 
post. In addition, increasing p increases the ex post probability that the firm will then actually 
be liquidated. Both effects make it more likely ex ante that the specific human capital of the 
firm will become worthless and hence decrease its incentives to develop it at t=0. 
However, and this reveals the essence of complementarity between R and H, the direct 
negative effect of p’s increase on H may be superseded by the indirect positive effect through 
p’s effect on R. This can be easily shown by assessing the effects of a stepwise increase of the 
value of p in Exhibit 6. Let us again 
assume that the status quo is 
characterized by the unique equilibrium 
(0,0). Increasing p c.p. will eventually 
(at point p’ in Exhibit 6) lead to R=r, 
given that the cost r is not excessively 
high. As was already mentioned, the 
indirect positive effect on the marginal 
return from switching to H=h would 
amount to ½bh/x  at that particular 
point. The direct negative effect on the 
marginal return amounts to 
∆ p(L+½b)h/x . Hence, if the preceding 
positive step in p is sufficiently small, 
the total effect on the firm’s incentives will be positive. Assume now, that the total effect was 
large enough to actually induce the firm to select H=h. Any further increase in p - and this 
stands in contrast to the conditional effect from an increase in b - will still have a direct 
negative impact on the marginal return from investing h. Thus, there may exist a sufficiently 
large value for p (point p’’ in Exhibit 6), above which the entrepreneur would return to his 




















Exhibit 6: Marginal returns as a function of p 
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Finally, κ I
H,1/L and κ I
H,α  are both strictly positive, so that a lower liquidation value and/or a 
higher sensitivity of the project’s payoff toward specific human capital will ex ante have a 
positive effect on the choice variable H. 
 
2.5.8 Complementarities  in  the basic model – a summary 
As the preceding analyses have shown, there exist sublattices of S, on which the objective 
function is supermodular with respect to the two choice variables and all parameters except p 
and 1/c. The parameter p is special, in that it has a positive effect on R, but a negative effect 
on H. However, complementarity between R and H can supersede this negative effect, so that 
a larger value for p can indeed bring about a switch from H=0 to H=h. For sublattices S* 
where these relations hold, we can then establish that larger values for h,  b, and 1/x  
unambiguously increase the attractiveness of investing in specific human capital and 
restructuring skills. By the same token, lower values of these parameters induce both the bank 
and the firm not to invest. 
Intuitively speaking, creditor-oriented bankruptcy laws principally imply a higher probability 
of liquidation and thus increase the debtor’s potential costs from losing control over the firm’s 
assets. A well suited device to mitigate these inefficiencies is to formulate an incentive-
compatible contract that induces the bank to acquire restructuring skills. Better opportunities 
to extract private benefits increase the bank’s ex post payoff from restructuring and thus make 
this device even more valuable. 
Exactly the opposite is true for debtor-oriented bankruptcy laws. Because of the low 
probability with which the bank is permitted to liquidate, she cannot be induced ex ante to 
invest in restructuring skills. As a consequence, the entrepreneur may find it not worthwhile 
to invest in specific human capital. Better opportunities to extract private benefits are 
detrimental in these circumstances because they drive up both the required repayment value 
of the loan and the ex ante liquidation probability. 
Thirdly, very debtor-oriented bankruptcy laws will in principle induce the entrepreneur to 
invest in specific human capital, as a liquidation becomes highly unlikely. But, because a 
bank with restructuring skills might then require a debt-contract with a very high contractual 
repayment value, the entrepreneur runs the risk that his project is no longer ”good” enough to 
satisfy her participation constraint (see Appendix 2 for an assessment of financing 
constraints). 
In the next section we introduce an alternative device for protecting investments in specific 
human capital. By admitting multiple creditors to finance the project the debtor can divide the 
total debt into a junior and a senior debt portion and thereby reduce the ex ante liquidation 
probability. 
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2.6 Multiple  creditors 
An interesting extension to our model can be obtained if we relax the assumption that the firm 
offers a credit contract to only one single bank. An alternative setting would be one in which 
a single bank holds senior debt and a homogeneous group comprising a large number of other 
investors, be it bondholders or participants in a credit syndicate, holds junior claims. 
We assume that each of the junior creditors holds a portion of the total debt amount that is 
sufficiently small so that free rider problems will preclude an investment in non-transferable 
restructuring skills (see Myers (1977), Bulow/Shoven (1978), Gertner/Scharfstein (1990)). 
Translated into our model this is equivalent to requiring that the ex post marginal return from 
restructuring that can be achieved by any of those creditors after repaying the senior debt 
portion is too small as to compensate for the initial investment r. Alternatively, we could 
assume that the firm is not willing to make sensitive information available to a larger group of 
outsiders and thus does not allow holders of junior debt to develop restructuring skills. As a 
consequence of either assumption, holders of junior debt can only choose between either 
remaining passive (implying ab) or seeking liquidation (aL) when the firm is wound up in 
financial distress. 
We furthermore assume, that the dispersed holders of junior debt obtain less information on 
the firm’s operations than the single senior creditor. This asymmetric distribution of 
information will prevail irrespective of the type R of the single creditor. Like courts, at t=1 the 
holders of junior debt can only observe whether the firm is in financial distress or not. This 
assumption could also be justified by recourse to free rider problems.
37 
We proceed in three steps. First, we show that the introduction of junior creditors will 
unambiguously decrease the incentives for the single senior creditor to acquire restructuring 
skills. We then prove that there exist optimal portions of senior and junior debt so that the 
liquidation probability can be reduced relative to a situation in which a single bank without 
restructuring skills finances the entire project. Depending on the parameter constellation, this 
reduction may lead to efficiency gains. Finally, we discuss the implications of this model 
extension on our findings regarding complementarity. 
 
2.6.1  Reduced incentives to invest in restructuring skills 
At t=0, the single bank holding the senior debt – henceforth denoted by B1 – compares the 
expected marginal return from investing in restructuring skills with the related cost r. 
Whereas in the basic model with an exclusive debtor-creditor relation, a bank of type R=r will 
restructure the firm as soon as a signal smaller than D-α H (but greater than xL
R=r) occurs, the 
incentives to do so are changed by the introduction of junior debt. Although a restructuring 
will still prevent the entrepreneur from extracting private benefits, the marginal return of ½b 
                                                 
37 We could have introduced a hypothetical cost that is small enough to leave the results of our basic model 
unchanged (i.e. a single bank would always try to obtain an informational advantage with regard to the precise 
signal value) but that is sufficiently large to prevent a large number of small creditors from seeking 
information. 
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may not be fully captured by B1. This is because her contractual claims on the firm amount 
only to D1, which must be smaller than the claim D in the basic model. 
A simple numerical example shall make the point clear: Let us assume that the nominal 
values of both the senior (D1) and the junior (D2) debt portions are equal to 30, so that the 
total amount of debt outstanding amounts to 60. The parameter b is set to 10. At t=1, a signal 
occurs which implies an expected total payoff of 50. All creditors will then conclude that the 
entrepreneur will inevitable select the risky action. Remember that even though holders of 
junior debt do not observe the exact signal value they do arrive at this conclusion as they 
realize that the firm is in financial distress (x+α H=π <D=D1+D2). If all creditors remain 
passive, i.e. neither liquidate nor restructure, than the risky action will turn out to be 
successful with probability ½, and yield a total return of 60, from which the debtor can 
capture 10 as a private benefit. B1 receives her full repayment amount D1=30 and B2 receives 
the remainder of 20. With the same probability, the risky action fails and only yields a return 
of 40. Again, B1 is repaid in full. It is the holders of junior debt who suffer by receiving only 
10, thus attributing an expected payoff of 15 to the risky action at t=1. Should B1 restructure, 
her own expected payoff will remain unchanged. The marginal return of 5 would be fully 
passed on to B2. Only if the signal is smaller than 40 will B1 profit at least partly from 
restructuring, and only if the signal is smaller than 30 will she obtain the entire marginal 
return.  
In conclusion, the lower expected return from restructuring will strictly decrease the ex ante 
attractiveness of restructuring. Compared with a situation in which she is the only creditor, 
this will lead B1 to request a higher contractual repayment amount ex ante. In turn, we can 
establish that an entrepreneur who, in order to ”protect” his specific human capital, seeks a 
bank willing to invest in restructuring skills will never approach multiple banks but will make 
an exclusive and incentive-compatible take-it-or-leave-it offer to just one single bank. 
As a consequence of this finding we will restrict our analysis in the remainder of this part to 
financial relationships where only banks without restructuring skills are involved. 
Furthermore, in order to proceed with our main argument, we can deduce that the exclusivity 
of financial relationships and investments in restructuring skills can be viewed as 
complementary to each other. 
 
2.6.2  Reduction of the ex ante liquidation probability 
The reasoning in this section proceeds from, and is thereby based on, two different, yet 
connected aspects of the financing problem in question. The first aspect follows from the 
assumption made above, namely that at t=1 the holders of junior debt can only differentiate 
between signals that imply financial health of the firm and those that imply financial distress. 
If they observe a financially healthy firm they – like an exclusive creditor - do not have any 
legal means at hand to force the entrepreneur into renegotiations and thus (have to) remain 
passive. However, if financial distress is signaled they (in sharp contrast to an informed 
exclusive creditor) have to decide between the two actions ”attempt liquidation” or ”remain 
passive” without knowing the precise value of the signal  ~ π . As rational agents they of course 
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compare the expected returns from the two alternatives and thereby also have to anticipate the 
action taken by B1. At this point we make use of the second aspect mentioned above. Since B1 
can only claim the portion D1 of the total debt amount outstanding D, her payoff function and 
also the critical signal value xL
B1 that will induce her to attempt a liquidation is different from 
that of an exclusive creditor. In this section we will show that the entrepreneur is able – 
through optimizing the contractual repayment amount D1 and thereby also predetermining the 
amount D2 – to reduce the ex ante liquidation probability and thus to increase the overall 
efficiency. We will not analyze this optimization problem in a general framework here. To 
bring across our point it suffices to proceed again somewhat heuristically. 
What will be the critical signal value that would induce B1 to switch from remaining passive 
to seeking liquidation? As was already mentioned, signals that imply a return larger than 
D1+b will not prompt B1 to react as she is repaid in full. Lower signals, however, will not only 
lead to an expected repayment that is smaller than was contracted at t=0 but that is also - and 
this stands in marked contrast to the situation in which she is the only creditor - smaller than 
the expected verifiable portion of the total payoff. The reason is simple and has already been 
provided in the numerical example above: In case the risky action is successful, holders of 
junior debt will capture a part of the return. As a consequence of that sharply ”kinked” payoff 
function of B1, a liquidation attempt is relatively more appealing to her than it is for an 
exclusive creditor B. 
B1 will base her decision whether to attempt a liquidation on the following consideration: 
With probability p she may liquidate and, if L+α H is larger than the D1+c, will receive the 
amount D1 in full. B2 then obtains the remainder of the liquidation value. With probability (1-
p) the entrepreneur remains in control and B1 will receive the same payoff as if she had 
remained passive, except that she has to bear the cost c if the risky action fails. If the risky 
action turns out to be successful she will be repaid D1 and the cost c has to be borne by the 
holders of junior debt. xL
B1 thus has to satisfy the following condition: 
pD1 + (1-p)[½(xL
B1-b-c)+½D1] = ½(xL
B1 -b) + ½D1 ⇔  xL
B1 = D1+b-c/p+c.  
It is important to note, that if D1 is chosen by the entrepreneur to be sufficiently small, i.e. 
D1<L+α H-c, the senior debtor B1’s decision will not depend on the liquidation value. 
Let us now return to the tradeoff faced by the holders of junior debt. Assume for a moment 
that they were able to observe the exact signal value. Then the critical signal value xL
B2 could 
be derived along the same lines as xL
B1 has been above: 
p(L+α H-c-D1)+(1-p)½[xL
B2+α H-D1-c]= ½(xL
B2+α H-D1) ⇔  xL
B2 = 2L-D1-c/p+c. 
As less-informed creditors, however, they have to weigh the foregone returns from not 
liquidating in the interval [xL
B1, xL
B2] against the potential opportunity cost from liquidating 
”too early” in the interval [xL
B2,D-α H]. If D1 is set to L-½b by the entrepreneur, the length of 
the first interval is zero and B2 will generally remain passive. As can easily be shown, an 
extremely profitable project would be required to preclude the entrepreneur from 
simultaneously stipulating D1 sufficiently low (to minimize the liquidation incentives of B1) 
and stipulating D2 sufficiently high (to prevent the holders of junior debt from always seeking 
a liquidation in financial distress). However, in these very circumstances, and for this 
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particular reason, the entrepreneur will prefer a credit contract with one single investor. 
Hence, we have established that the initiative for a liquidation will never come from B2. 
In a final step, we now compare the critical signal value xL
B1 from this section with the critical 
signal value xL
R=0 that applies to the case of an exclusive creditor without restructuring skills. 
In section 2.5.2 we found that xL
R=0 is equal to L+½b-c/p. If we arbitrarily set D1 to L-½b, xL
B1 
will equal xL
R=0+c and will thus lead to a higher ex ante liquidation probability than in the 
case of one single creditor. However, the key point in this section is that the entrepreneur may 
optimize his payoff and hence his total return by choosing an appropriate value for D1. As 
xL
B1 is a linear function of D1, by reducing D1 below L-½b-c he may achieve a lower ex ante 
liquidation probability than implied by xL
R=0, irrespective of the value of p. In reducing D1 
further the project’s return will increase until the liquidation probability converges to that 
implied by x* of the first-best case. The smallest efficiency loss to be achieved with multiple 
creditors, however, still crucially depends on the parameter values and in particular on those 
of p and the dead weight cost c. It is interesting to note that high values of p allow the 
entrepreneur to fine-tune the liquidation probability towards the first best. As p converges to 
1, xL
B1 simplifies to D1+b+c. If permitted by the parameter constellation, the entrepreneur will 
then rationally set D1 at L-h-b-c and thereby achieve xL
B1=x*. 
We should add that we have so far neglected any extra cost that may arise from searching for 
and contracting with multiple investors. In reality this extra cost might be prohibitively high, 
so that the multiple-investor strategy is not a viable option for solving the financing problem. 
This holds in particular for small and medium size firms. 
 
2.7  Summary of the results 
In the preceding three sections we have discussed the implications of relaxing the assumption 
regarding the exclusivity of the debtor-creditor relation. On the one hand, the involvement of 
multiple creditors lowers the incentives of any individual creditor to invest in restructuring 
skills. On the other hand we have demonstrated that, given asymmetric information between 
the holder of senior debt and the holders of junior debt, this involvement may actually lead to 
efficiency gains if the entrepreneur can decrease the liquidation probability below the level in 
an exclusive relationship by setting an optimal repayment value D1.
38 What makes this 
optimization possible is that in comparing a liquidation attempt to remaining passive, the 
holder of senior debt is no longer focussed on the liquidation value but rather on the 
contractual repayment value D1. At the same time, holders of junior debt will generally 
remain passive ex post because the opportunity costs of liquidating ”too early” exceed the 
expected losses from a ”late” liquidation by the holder of senior debt. 
With due caution we conclude that there exists another equilibrium in our model that implies 
a complementary relationship between the multiplicity of creditors, high incentives not to 
invest in restructuring skills and the parameter p. As the entrepreneur is able to reduce the ex 
                                                 
38 The result, that an asymmetric distribution of information among different agents may increase social welfare 
is also obtained by Aghion/Bolton (1997) and Crémer (1995). 
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ante liquidation probability considerably, the decision to invest into specific human capital 
and the value h itself turn out to be also complementary elements. 
An overall assessment of our results leads us to the following three primary solutions to the 
financing problem in question: 
(1)  In a financial system that encompasses a creditor-friendly bankruptcy law (high value 
for p) and in which banks can easily build up restructuring skills (high value for 1/r), firms 
have strong incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital because they can be (partly) 
assured that they are not deprived of its worth by ”too-early” liquidations. Good opportunities 
to extract private benefits reinforce these effects. 
(2)  If, however, banks face high costs of adopting restructuring skills and the firm has 
(easy, i.e. at low cost) access to capital markets or to multiple creditors, a creditor-friendly 
bankruptcy law – in combination with low bankruptcy – may in general lead to an equilibrium 
in which the firm is able to optimize the ex ante liquidation probability through stipulating the 
mix of senior and junior debt. A necessary condition for this is that the information 
concerning the quality of the project is asymmetrically distributed between the two groups of 
debt holders. In case this asymmetry is leveled out, the liquidation probability will 
immediately jump to a level that is equal to, or even higher than, the level in an exclusive 
debtor-creditor relation in which the creditor has no restructuring skills. 
(3)  Finally, if the bankruptcy law is debtor-friendly, if restructuring skills are costly to 
acquire, if private benefits are difficult to appropriate and if technologies do not allow for a 
high input of specific human capital, firms will face low incentives to invest in specific 
human capital and will hence prefer an arm’s-length relationship with one single bank. 
As has become obvious, the bankruptcy law represents a central component of our model. We 
have demonstrated that its attributes have important implications for other elements of a 
financial system. In the following part of this paper we present some stylized facts of three 
real financial systems. They indicate that the results of our model bear considerable relevance 
for the analysis and evaluation of a financial system. We start with a brief overview over the 
bankruptcy laws in the United States, Great Britain and Germany and subsequently rank them 
in terms of their creditor-orientation. A discussion of other relevant characteristics of the three 
financial systems follows. 
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3  Bankruptcy law and credit relationships in the USA, Germany 
and Great Britain 
3.1  The bankruptcy law 
Concise descriptions of the bankruptcy laws in the three observed countries can be found in 
two recently published articles by Franks/Nyborg/Torous (1996) and Kaiser (1996). In their 
work, Franks/Nyborg/Torous focus on the different degrees to which the bankruptcy laws 
protect the interests of various involved parties (i.e. the creditors and debtors). The following 
table borrows extensively from their work and provides a useful summary of major 
differences of the laws: 





New Insolvency Code 
Who holds the 
controlling rights of the 
company during the 
procedure? 
Creditors gain control, 
board of directors must 
resign, receiver acts in the 
interests of the creditors 
with floating charge 
Often debtor in control, 
but in 50% of cases the 
incumbent management 
stays in control 
Creditors gain control 
Do debt claims have to 
be served during the 
procedure? 
Yes  Nearly all payments are 
suspended (”automatic 
stay”) 
Automatic stay for 
unsecured credit, secured 
credit is suspended for at 
least three months 
Can liabilities be 
restructured? 
No  Yes, and this is even 
decisively influenced by 
the debtor 
Yes, but all groups of 
creditors have to agree 
What restrictions apply 
to the continued running 
of the company? 
Secured lenders can 
liquidate any affected 
assets at any time 
No important restrictions  Creditors` meeting must be 
in favor 
Will the shareholders be 
serviced at the expense 
of the debtors? 
Very unlikely to happen  Occurs very often  Possible, but only with the 
creditors’ permission 
How high are the direct 
costs of the procedure? 
Low, due to the short 
duration of the process and 
no involvement of the 
courts 
High, because of the 
length of the procedure 
and the extensive 
involvement of the 
courts 
Medium, although the courts 
are heavily involved the 
creditors are able to shorten 
the procedure if they wish 
Table 7: Characteristics of the bankruptcy laws in the USA, Great Britain and Germany 
In order to be able to interpret the above table accurately it is necessary to add a further 
remark on alternative bankruptcy procedures that parties can potentially file for in the three 
countries. In Great Britain, there generally exist five different types of procedures to choose 
from. Direct liquidation, company voluntary arrangements (CVA), arrangement under the 
Companies Act 1985 and, since 1986, administrative receivership all exist alongside the 
receivership procedure. Due to the fact that in 1990 approx. 95% of all cases fell under the 
receivership or direct liquidation categories
39, we will restrict ourselves to an examination of 
                                                 
39 See Rajak (1994). 
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these two types. In the case of direct liquidation (75% of cases), the focus is solely on the 
interests of the creditors and the control rights are assigned first and foremost to those with 
claims on assets of the company in the form of a fixed charge.
40 In many cases the company is 
liquidated within the first few days or weeks after the procedure has been opened, and in 
nearly all cases the management loses its authority. Hence, only the receivership procedure 
could possibly imply at least some debtor-orientation. 
In the USA ”chapter 7” exists as an alternative to ”chapter 11” featured in Table 7 above. The 
former carries similar effects with it to those associated with the British liquidation 
proceedings or the currently valid German compulsory liquidation (Konkursordnung), whose 
aims are the fast and efficient liquidation of a financially distressed debtor firm. An empirical 
indication of the relative importance of the two procedures can be gained by examining the 
proceedings in progress in the Central District of California Bankruptcy Court in December 
1993 of which approximately 12% fell under ”chapter 11”.
41 This may seem low, but 
compared with the fraction of German companies which were able to escape the compulsory 
liquidation procedure by using the alternative formal ”composition procedure” 
(Vergleichsordnung), this number actually appears be very high: Between 1985-1992 the 
fraction of German bankruptcy cases which went through court-supervised reorganization 
was only 0,39%, of which only 60% resulted in a successful reorganization.
42 The new 
German bankruptcy law (Insolvenzrecht), which will come into effect in 1999 and which was 
presented in the table, is considerably influenced by the existing bankruptcy law, but tends to 
level out the formerly strong differences between the various groups of creditors (i.e. 
unsecured and secured creditors).
43 
Table 7 thus a solid basis for an assessment of the creditor-orientation of the most important 
bankruptcy laws that are in force in the three countries at present or in the near future. A 
comparison of Great Britain and the USA reveals that their laws indeed possess remarkably 
different orientations. Whilst British creditors enjoy virtually unlimited control over the 
course of actions and can liquidate the company at any time, in the USA both the debtors and 
the courts play a major role. The former possess a number of rights, which enable them to 
delay the proceedings and therefore can be exercised to extend their period of office. Gilson 
(1989) estimates that approximately half of all boards of directors remain in office and that in 
the majority of the other cases, the new leadership is selected from within the affected 
company itself. Consequently, a sample survey of 111 publicly listed corporations which 
went into bankruptcy proceedings between 1979 and 1985 revealed that the mean duration of 
”chapter 11” proceedings was nearly two years.
44 In addition, several studies consider the 
question whether the ”chapter 11” procedure leads to a division of future income or 
                                                 
40 A fixed charge is a claim on specific, immovable assets of a firm, for example, land or buildings. A floating 
charge is a claim on less clearly defined, moveable assets such as stocks, inventories and work in progress.   
41 See Franks/Nyborg/Torous (1996). 
42 See Kaiser (1996). 
43 In the future interest and redemption payments to secured lenders will be interrupted for at least three months. 
Furthermore, a firm will no longer be permitted to give some creditor the status of a preferred creditor.. 
Finally, some of the power of the administrator will be transferred to the creditors’ assembly.  
44 See Gilson (1990). 
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liquidation proceeds which is in line with the ex ante financing agreement, or whether 
deviations from the absolute priority rule (APR) are frequent and substantial. In two studies, 
Weiss (1990) and Franks/Torous (1989) show that in 80% and 50% of observed cases, junior 
creditors received payments despite the fact that the claims of the senior creditors could not 
be fully met. Eberhard/Moore/Roenfeldt (1990) find that the average violation of the APR 
due to payments to shareholders amounts to 7,6% of the total value paid to all claimants. 
In contrast to the findings for the USA, Olsen (1996) finds no indication of a deviation from 
the APR for the British receivership procedure. Similarly, work by Geßner et al. (1978) and 
Landfermann (1994) on the German bankruptcy law reveals no significant deviation from the 
APR. 
It is therefore a fairly safe conclusion to draw that the British bankruptcy procedure is clearly 
creditor-oriented, while the US is thoroughly debtor-oriented. The German bankruptcy law, 
while not empowering individual creditors to the same extent as the British law, is far less 
similar to the American ”chapter 11”. LaPorta et al. (1997) draw a very similar conclusion in 
their comparative study of different national laws. On a scale of zero to four, which measures 
the position of creditors in the case of an insolvency, Great Britain scores a four, Germany a 
three and the USA only a one. 
An analogous comparison can be made by comparing the costs of bankruptcy procedures, 
however. However, concrete estimates are only available for the USA. Warner (1977), 
Altman (1984) and Weiss (1990) estimate the direct costs to be 3% to 6% of the company’s 
value one year prior to the proceedings. In addition to these direct costs there are indirect or 
opportunity costs. Senbet/Seward (1995, P. 945) define indirect costs as losses of welfare 
which  ”[…]collectively represent the outcome of suboptimal actions taken by corporate 
stakeholders”. Altman (1984) estimate these to be 15% for industrial and 8.7% for retail 
enterprises. 
As the courts play a far smaller role and, on average, the proceedings are much shorter in 
Great Britain, it can be assumed that welfare losses are also lower, whereas Germany 
probably takes a position somewhere in between. 
Up until this point we have neglected one important aspect when dealing with the stylized 
empirical facts of bankruptcy procedures, namely the relevant incentives to come to some 
kind of private agreement (i.e. outside the realms of bankruptcy proceedings). Generally, we 
can expect high proceedings costs to create a positive incentive to settle privately, due to the 
potential savings which might result. On the other hand, one might suggest that the various 
parties bargaining positions, as ascribed to them by the relevant bankruptcy laws, play an 
important role in whether and to what extent they strive for a private discussion and 
settlement and how willing they are to compromise. As shown above, under ”chapter 11” an 
American debtor is endowed with considerable rights, so that his bargaining power in a 
private workout tends to be greater than that of a British or German company, which has to 
reckon with impending liquidation should negotiations fail. Which alternative forms of action 
are available to the creditors also plays a decisive role in how attractive private workouts are 
and what their outcomes tend to be. Should the creditors be in the position to successfully 
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reorganize the company, resulting in higher income than could be gained through liquidation, 
then the chances of private workouts are greater. 
How well are these assumptions supported by empirical evidence? Studies examining the 
comparative costs of formal and private proceedings show, without exception, that cost 
savings can be generated by avoiding the involvement of courts and shortening the 
proceedings. For Great Britain, Olsen (1996) estimates the total costs of a private settlement 
to be 3% of the firm’s value, and in the USA these costs seems to be even lower, 
Gilson/John/Lang (1990) finding values between 0.32% and 0.65%. From this we can deduce 
that, at least in the USA, there are strong cost driven incentives in favor of private 
settlements. By their nature, the implications of various levels of bargaining power are more 
difficult to measure. However, the available empirical evidence suggests that the weighting of 
interests in the relevant bankruptcy law also shows up in private workouts in the various 
countries. Olsen (1996) investigates a sample of 35 British firms, which took part in private 
settlements, and finds that, on average, secured lenders waived 12% of their due payments, 
half of which went to unsecured lenders and the other to the owners. Franks/Torous (1994) 
find that for 82 US-American firms, both secured lenders (7%) and lenders without security 
(1%) reduced their debt claims, all of which fell to the owners. In comparison to a strict 
application of the APR, shareholders are the main beneficiaries of the ”softness” of the US-
bankruptcy law even in out-of-court settlements. Whilst no comparable figures exist for 
Germany, Kaiser (1996, p.78) notes that: ”[…]the main result of the extremely poor 
reorganization provisions in German bankruptcy law is that banks unilaterally determine the 
optimal treatment of distressed firms. If it is determined that a firm will be resuscitated, the 
house bank will organize an out-of-court workout to effect a reorganization […] Thus, firms 
which wind up in insolvency proceedings have already been deemed nonviable by the banks.” 




3.2  Restructuring incentives for creditors 
How attractive private workouts are, also depends on whether an alternative to liquidation is 
available to the creditors or not, and if so, how easy it is to use it. Turning our attention first 
to the stylized facts about the USA, Kaiser (1996, p.77) comments: ”As a result of legal 
precedent in the US regarding lender liability, banks are discouraged from forming close 
working relationships with their clients. Banks become hesitant about providing advice to a 
company for fear of being held financially liable for any directions that may result in a loss in 
firm value”. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which only allows banks to have equity holdings 
in non-financial companies as an exception to the rule, as well as a relatively easy access for 
debtor companies to funds from highly developed capital markets, make credible long-term 
ties to a bank more difficult. When accompanied by only limited control in the case of a 
reorganization, this provides a further reason why a close working relationship with the 
                                                 
45 Refer to section 2.4.2 for an interesting analogy between the empirical evidence and the potential outcomes of 
private workouts implied by our model. Banks with restructuring skills obtain strictly higher payoffs. 
   39
debtor firm would not appear to be very useful. Most private settlements primarily lead to 
debt relief and reshuffling of liabilities and equity, while the creditors’ possibilities remain 
restricted as far as exercising control is concerned.
46 Private settlements hence only appear 
advantageous to a bank as long as the costs of formal procedures are higher than the 
associated financial gains. 
Considerable obstacles are also faced by any bank in Britain which is willing to restructure a 
company rather than liquidate it: Overall creditors possess an extremely strong bargaining 
position as their threat to liquidate the firm must be considered highly credible, and several 
legal and institutional features of the British system make a restructuring of a distressed firm 
seem unattractive. Firstly, all bankruptcy law procedures, along with their one-sided emphasis 
towards a particular group of creditors, stand in the way of a coordination of creditors’ efforts. 
As a likely consequence of this inability to coordinate, hold-up-problems may arise in the 
sense that junior creditors do not restructure the company when the advantages will largely be 
captured by creditors secured by a fixed charge. On the other hand, the latter also only 
possess low incentives to restructure, because lenders secured by a floating charge can call in 
receivers who solely represent their own interests. Secondly there is the danger that a creditor 
who gives advice or plays some other active role in a borrower firm, may be held legally 
liable for any damage incurred by others.
47 This is due to the common law tradition which the 
British and the American law share.
48 Thirdly, newly injected capital to prolong the existence 
of a company is generally dealt with as junior capital, exposing it to a very high risk. 
Fourthly, free-rider problems between creditors, which rise in proportion to their number, and 
restricted commitment possibilities on the part of the companies
49 prevent restructuring banks 
from any certainty of long-term compensation for the efforts and risks they would have to 
undertake. Finally, until the end of the eighties, the British banking sector was characterized 
by a strict functional segmentation. This did not favor close financial relationships, because 
each bank only provided certain financial services. Therefore the frequently presented picture 
in the literature of an arm’s length relationship between British banks and companies seems to 
fit the negative restructuring incentives sketched here.
50 
What conclusions may be drawn from the creditor-oriented bankruptcy law and the 
simultaneously negative incentives regarding restructurings? Similar to Kaiser (1996, p.78) 
we assume that ”[…]creditors are more willing to grant concessions to successfully conclude 
a workout in the US, than [in] Britain where their security is protected and the costs of 
reorganizing (or failing and then liquidating) within insolvency proceedings are lower”. 
                                                 
46 See Franks/Nyborg/Torous (1996), P. 98: ”[…] evidence suggests that part of the gains accruing to equity 
holders comes from bargaining power rather than correcting the incentives to invest.” 
47 See Dimsdale/Prevezer (1994), P. 34: ”Closer association between banks and borrowing companies could 
give rise to problems, since under the Insolvency Act of 1998 a bank could run the risk of being deemed to be 
a shadow director of a company experiencing trading difficulties. The bank could in these circumstances be 
liable to severe penalties”. 
48 For a description of legal traditions and their influence on financial systems see La Porta et al. (1997). 
49 The comparatively highly efficient capital markets with respect to other countries may, amongst other reasons, 
be held responsible for the existence of limited commitment possibilities. Both the ”market for corporate 
control” and the expansion of capital market financing undermine long-term and intensive relationships. 
50 See Dimsdale/Prevezer (1994) and Charkham (1994). 
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Consequently, given a comparable debtor-creditor arrangement, we expect the probability of 
liquidation to be greater in Britain. From this perspective the British Insolvency Act of 1986 
and the measures to deregulate the banking sector can be interpreted as an attempt by the 
government to reduce the likelihood of liquidation and simultaneously to provide incentives 
for forming closer ties between creditors and debtors. However, previous remarks have made 
clear that these objectives are undermined by the fear of being held financially liable and the 
considerable role of the capital markets.
51 It is therefore hardly surprising that the new 
administration-procedure has rarely been applied since its introduction in 1986.
52 
Turning finally to the German financial system, we are presented with virtually the exact 
opposite practice with respect to private workouts, despite a comparably creditor-friendly 
bankruptcy law to that of Britain. Franke (1983) estimates that approximately half of all 
potential bankruptcy proceedings are averted by private reorganizations. This is hardly 
surprising as for all five arguments lying behind the incentives presented against 
reorganization by British banks the opposite is true for the German system: The German 
bankruptcy law contains nothing comparable to receivership, where junior creditors who are 
only secured by a floating charge can protect their interests. Furthermore, in the German legal 
system, which takes its roots in the tradition of civil law, creditors can be held far less 
financially liable for any advice they give. Recently injected funds do not have to be 
considered as junior, but rather can have their status determined by the creditors. In addition, 
German banks are threatened with very little competition from capital markets once 
reorganization has successfully been completed, so that any funds put into the company 
during the run up to, and during the reorganization, can also be regained from the debtor in 
the long term. Finally, and this is probably the most compelling aspect, Germany possesses a 
long tradition of universal banking, which permits banks to hold shares in debtor companies 
and to use their role as house bank to carry out a broad range of other financial activities. This 
requires, and at the same time permits and even fosters, a close relationship between creditor 
and debtor, based on an intensive exchange of information which definitely improves the 
ability to reorganize the company. Through their partial ownership of the firm, the bank also 
becomes more interested in maximizing the value of a distressed firm and no longer in just 
maximizing the amount regained in outstanding debt claims. Other authors add ”social 
prestige” (Franks/Nyborg/Torous(1996)) or the ”reputation as a supportive lead bank” 
(Kaiser (1996)) as additional incentives for reorganization. This contribution to the argument 
appears to be plausible once we take into account the endeavors of the bank to maintain a 
profitable long-term house bank relationship with as many companies as possible. It is 
precisely this concentration of the  debtors` liabilities to a single bank or at most a small 
group of banks, in which one - typically the house bank - dominates, what reduces holdup and 
free-rider problems. 
                                                 
51 In a theoretical analysis Dinç (1996) advances the bank’s reputation not to liquidate as the central requirement 
for the establishment of close credit relationships. According to Dinç, the chances of attaining such a 
reputation fall as the role of capital markets and the intensity of competition in the banking sector increases.  
52 See Franks/Torous (1993). 
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We conclude that in the German system liquidation typically occurs if a reorganization does 
not provides sufficient reasons for a relatively well informed bank that the continuation of the 
debtor company will be profitable in the long-term. 
 
In the conclusions section we use the empirical facts about the bankruptcy procedures and the 
considerations about the incentives for banks to reorganize in the three systems, to point out 
parallels to the equilibria in our model. Based on this foundation we then derive hypotheses 
about the effects connected with other components of the relevant financial systems, before 
finally considering the implications for the convergence of financial systems. 
 
4 Conclusions 
Naturally, we do not expect our model to provide a full account of something as complex as 
an entire financial system. Instead we restrict ourselves to credit financing and ignore any 
possible alternative solutions to the financing problem. Nevertheless, we believe to have 
shown which mechanisms may be responsible for the interrelated effects of bankruptcy law 
on the one hand and incentives for banks to restructure companies on the other. We did also 
shed some light on the additional influence of other components, such as the incentive to 
build up firm-specific human capital or the possibilities to appropriate private benefits of 
control. Hence, our model should be considered as an attempt to provide some reasons for the 
stability of financial systems and thereby for the coexistence of profoundly different types of 
financial systems. 
The starting point of the model is the analysis of a particular financing problem, which 
includes as an important component the investment decision in firm-specific human capital. 
In the basic framework we discuss two mechanisms for solving this problem. On the one 
hand, a creditor orientated insolvency law provides banks with an incentive to invest in 
restructuring skills which gives rise to the bank not liquidating a company, but appropriating 
income from a reorganization instead.
53 On the other hand a debtor-oriented bankruptcy law 
directly reduces creditors’ incentives to liquidate, thus protecting firm-specific human capital. 
However, the effectiveness of the latter mechanism decreases due to increasing specific 
human capital intensity in a project, whereas the former mechanism becomes more suitable. 
In addition, a third alternative has already been presented in section 2.6. If a strongly creditor-
oriented bankruptcy law is in place and if at the same time the adoption of restructuring skills 
causes prohibitively high fixed costs, the chances of liquidation can be reduced through the 
addition of a further group of junior and less well informed creditors. Through an appropriate 
                                                 
53 Empirical evidence is available for the positive relationship between close bank to company ties and the 
chances of a companies` continuation under conditions of financial-distress. For example in a study of 
Japanese firms in financial distress Hoshi/Kashyap/Scharfstein (1990) find that companies that are closely tied 
to their (few) creditors sell and invest significantly more than those with loose ties. The authors hold lower 
information problems between borrowers and lenders, reduced free-rider problems as a result of the low 
number of parties involved, and increased incentives for active intervention on the side of the bank 
responsible for this result. 
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distribution of its overall debt exposure between different creditors a company is in a position 
to reduce the ex ante liquidation incentives of both groups and thereby to protect its specific 
human capital. If a firm is denied access to further creditors, or if there are no information 
asymmetries between creditor groups, then there is little incentive to build up firm-specific 
human capital. 
At this point it may suffice to point out the similarities between the first solution and the 
stylized features of the German financial system, between the second solution and the US-
American financial system, and between the third solution and the British financial system. If 
these parallels are deemed convincing, one can infer from our model that firm-specific human 
capital is more prevalent in Germany than in the two other countries because the combination 
of close ties between banks and firms and a creditor-oriented bankruptcy law encourages the 
formation of specific human capital. For the USA, we correspondingly hypothesize that credit 
financing only supports firm-specific investment in human capital up to a certain point. 
Nevertheless, the American system proves to be very efficient for projects in which specific 
human capital plays only a minor role but general human capital is more important.
54 
As far as the British system is concerned, we conclude that protection of firm-specific human 
capital can only be achieved through mechanisms which act as substitutes for a close banking 
relationship. We have identified as one possible candidate a relationship between one debtor 
and multiple creditors. In principle, this constellation should be feasible in a debtor-oriented 
system, like the one in the USA, but it would not provide such a strong incentive against 
liquidation because the liquidation probability is already low with a debtor-oriented 
bankruptcy law. As a consequence, removing the assumption of asymmetric information 
between groups of creditors in a US-style system causes no fundamental change in the 
efficiency level of this configuration. The liquidation incentives of junior creditors are 
virtually identical to those of an exclusive creditor as presented in the basic model. In the 
British system however, the probability of liquidation shoots up with respect to decreasing 
information asymmetries, because the bankruptcy law helps the junior creditors to push 
through a desired liquidation without hindrance. 
From the perspective of our model, Franks/Nyborg/Torous (1996) demand for bankruptcy 
laws to create greater incentives for information sharing amongst creditors is to be judged 
with caution. The authors criticize the British bankruptcy law because the non-uniform 
                                                 
54 There exists some empirical evidence on the different roles of firm-specific human capital in Germany and the 
USA: The German (and more generally, the continental European) labor market is characterized by (1) a 
higher overall unemployment rate, (2) lower fluctuation rates, and (3) a higher average wage discount that 
skilled employees have to bear after temporary unemployment than that of the USA (see Cohen et al. (1997), 
referring comments by Andersen and Bean, Cohen (1998), and Bean (1993)). Furthermore, new empirical 
research by Harhoff/Kane (1996) and Acemoglu (1996) indicates higher levels of investment in firm-specific 
human capital in Germany than in the US. Combined, these findings suggest the following: Higher levels of 
firm-specific human capital will typically lead to more rigid labor markets, as incumbent employees with firm-
specific skills face a lower probability of getting fired and in case there are fired will not be able to employ 
their specific skills in other firms, demanding a different skillset. The length of the unemployment period and 
the size of the wage discount will thus be positively correlated to the specificity of a discharged employee’s 
human capital (theoretical models on this relation can be found in Chang/Wang (1995,1996) and 
Acemoglu/Pischke (1998)). Our definition of the private liquidation cost H is based on this potential negative 
effect of specific human capital. 
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method in which individual groups of creditors are handled restricts the transfer of 
information between them. In our model however, it is precisely this apparent disadvantage 
that leads to the desired effect of hindering early company liquidation. 
In a system configuration in which banks are able to restructure firms guaranteeing the 
protection of firm-specific human capital, as is probably best represented by the German 
system, the introduction of multilateral relationships would clearly have destabilizing effects. 
The anticipated benefits for each creditor, which results from a restructuring, will fall due to 
the marginal payoffs being spread amongst all creditors involved. However, these potential 
free-rider effects could possibly be mitigated by concluding implicit contracts between all the 
creditors involved. The main creditor would thereby commit himself to invest in restructuring 
skills whereas the other creditors would promise not to liquidate the firm ”too early”. In order 
to make all these commitments binding, any bank would have to be a main bank for some 
firms on which the other banks have minor claims, and have minor claims on those firms for 
which another party to the implicit contract acts as the main bank. A bank that breaches the 
implicit contract would then have to fear being penalized by the other banks. 
 
What can be said about the empirical relevance of the other model parameters and their 
illustrated implications on the stability of financial systems? 
First let us examine the parameter b, which serves as a measure of the opportunities for the 
entrepreneur to appropriate private benefits of control. We have shown that the 
complementarity between the investment in firm-specific human capital and the investment in 
restructuring skills grows proportionally to b. In addition, the marginal benefit from an 
investment in restructuring skills increases with this parameter. The direct consequence is that 
systems in which, as a rule, close ties exist between investors and borrowers have a 
comparative advantage in dealing with a high potential of appropriating private benefits of 
control. In reality this country specific potential is, by its very nature, very difficult to 
measure. Zingales (1994, 1995, 1997) has tried to achieve this by indirect means in a number 
of papers. For this purpose, he compares the dividend-adjusted share price differential of 
voting and non-voting stock of the same company over time. He assumes that the estimated 
price differential can primarily be put down to the different control rights associated with 
each share type, once again on the grounds that these control rights would be valuable 
because of the possibilities to appropriate private benefits. The surprising result of his studies 
is that the size of the price differential clearly varies between countries and is negatively 
correlated to the quality of accounting standards in terms of strict disclosure requirements.
55 
Both Great Britain and the USA are ranked at the bottom end of the scale for control premia 
and at the top for the strictness of their statutory accounting requirements. No similar study 
has been found for Germany and we hope to close this gap in a further paper. Our initial 
quantitative results indicate fairly conclusively that the price differential in Germany must be 
                                                 
55  See Zingales (1997), p. 14. 
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substantially higher than in the other two countries.
56 This would appear to support the 
argument by Zingales, as Germany’s disclosure requirements and rules to protect small retail 
investors are generally considered to be lax in comparison to those of other countries. 
Naturally, these conjectures also apply to companies that mainly cover their external 
financing requirement by loans. Based on the empirical evidence, we therefore draw the 
speculative conclusion that Germany’s financial system tends to provide more potential for 
the appropriation of private benefits of control than is the case in the USA or Great Britain. 
According to our model, the respective potentials can be interpreted as stabilizing 
components of the system configurations. 
Let us now turn to the incentives for investment in firm-specific human capital. These are not 
obviously country specific and thus empirical evidence on international differences is hard to 
find.
57 Nevertheless, a comparative advantage may be determined for those systems in which 
close bank ties are more frequently encountered. The higher the level of firm-specific human 
capital, the greater becomes the need in systems without such ties to strengthen the bargaining 
position of the borrowers in the bankruptcy procedure, or in other words, the more important 
the role of alternative protective mechanisms, such as provided by multilateral credit 
relationships in which there is asymmetric information. However, weakening the creditor’s 
bargaining position could bring with it credit rationing. To use the terminology of our model, 
lenders are only willing to provide the necessary funds for projects if offered nominal 
repayment amounts – which must be higher for more debtor-oriented bankruptcy laws - that 
do not exceed the largest possible payoff (see also Appendix 2). A connection which is also 
deemed relevant by Kaiser (1996, p.74), who notes that: ”[…]the strength of the creditors’ 
bargaining position in financial distress in Germany should result in less credit rationing, 
though there is no strong evidence that this is the case”. 
We therefore conclude that so called insider-systems, in which firm-specific information is 
confidentially used by the bank and its borrower, tend to encourage the investment in firm-
specific human capital in smaller companies more than so called outsider-systems, in which 
firm-specific information is passed on to outsiders through strict compulsory disclosure rules 
or is not passed on at all. In an interesting analogy to our argument Shleifer/Summers (1988) 
interpret a lack of incentives for investment in firm-specific human capital as an indirect cost 
of corporate takeovers. 
 
Our model shows the importance of complementarity of certain key elements of any viable 
financial system. This allows us to conclude our paper with a somewhat speculative note on 
the convergence of financial systems. Because, as our model demonstrates, it is imperative for 
well-functioning systems that its complementary elements fit together, we doubt that the 
different financial systems within Europe would converge endogenously, i.e. driven by 
efficiency considerations alone, since at least in the two European countries examined in our 
                                                 
56 In as yet unpublished work, we found the price differential for German corporations to exceed 30%. This 
result stands in stark contrast to the average price differentials measured for the UK (see Megginson (1990)) 
and the USA (see Zingales (1995)). Both amount to less than 10%. 
57 But see FN54.  
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paper, two vastly distinct, but consistent financial systems have developed over time. The two 
systems are each composed of elements which take on almost ”polar” sets of values. As these 
sets can be interpreted to constitute two equilibria implied by our model, we conjecture that 
any politically motivated attempt to modify single elements of these two systems, such as the 
bankruptcy law
58 or the disclosure requirements, will fail in the short-run. Our model predicts 
that such a modification would ensue welfare losses and because of that would prompt 
circumventing measures by agents trying to adapt to these changes. Complementarity thus 
rules out a smooth convergence. It implies that convergence can only be achieved by 
drastically modifying all or at least a sufficient number of elements of a system 
simultaneously. The most likely scenario for such a dramatic shift to occur is a crisis hitting 
this financial system. Such a crisis could be triggered either by an exogenous shock (e.g. 
globalization) or by far-reaching politically motivated changes which do not allow the agents 
to adapt adequately and thus would lead to an incoherent, dysfunctional system. An 
alternative second scenario, namely one in which change is brought about by a straight and 
fast ”leap” from one equilibrium to another, seems much more unlikely to occur, because this 
would require a coordinated approach by all agents including legislative bodies. As we deem 
the crisis-scenario more plausible, we conjecture that a convergence of financial systems 
would cause significant welfare losses to the economies that, intentionally or unintentionally, 
embark on a change.
59 
Such losses can be exemplified by means of our model: If a (German) bank has repeatedly 
invested into restructuring skills, it might be expected that learning effects would have 
decreased her fixed cost r over time. If those repeated investments applied to subsequent 
projects of one particular firm the information accumulated in the past would have further 
decreased r. In addition, such a bank, which might eventually be considered as the house bank 
of the firm, would have the opportunity to build up a reputation for successful corporate 
restructuring, generally making it easier for other firms to find a financing partner who could 
guarantee greater protection of their specific human capital. Were this system configuration 
now to be severely disturbed, e.g. through a fundamental amendment to the bankruptcy law 
and considerably stricter statutory disclosure requirements, this could result in substantial 
welfare losses, since as a result of reduced restructuring possibilities not only the collected 
information but also the reputation of being successful in restructuring would become 
worthless. Even worse, should (German) banks no longer be willing to invest in restructuring 
skills, new firms may renounce to build up specific human capital and employees of 
established firms may incur large private losses as the probability of early liquidations is 
sharply increased. 
                                                 
58 A pan-European alignment of bankruptcy laws is for example advocated by Kaiser (1996). 
59 The German system in particular seems to be very susceptible to change. Amongst other reasons its still 
underdeveloped capital markets provide few alternative devices to reduce the probability of company 
liquidation. A similar argument on the possible convergence of corporate governance systems is developed in 
a related paper by Schmidt/Spindler (1998). They point out the prominent role of implicit contracts between 
all stakeholders of a firm as a characteristic feature of the German financial system. As implicit contracts are 
very susceptible to exogenous shocks, they conjecture that the overall stability of the German system is 
currently in danger.  
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A final conjecture concerns the possibility to create a ”middle of the road”-financial system 
that would combine the alleged merits of insider and outsider system. The reason is simple: A 
system comprising close ties between banks and firms, high incentives to build up specific 
human capital, easy access to capital markets and an active market for corporate control is not 
coherent and hence not stable. Persistent attempts to arrive at such a hypothetical 
configuration of a financial system might even lead to the crisis-scenario mentioned above. 
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Appendix 1: Incentive compatible debt contracts 
In this appendix we derive a sufficient incentive compatibility constraint for the debt contract. 
If the resulting condition is satisfied by the amount of the initial investment I, the 
entrepreneur may, by appropriately stipulating the repayment value D, induce a bank to build 
up restructuring skills. 
We hence examine whether it is actually optimal for the bank to invest r if this would 
maximize the entrepreneur’s ex ante payoff from the project or whether she could increase her 
own ex ante payoff by saving r and foregoing the potential ex post marginal return from 
restructuring.
60 
In section 2.5.6 we have already derived the relevant condition from the entrepreneur’s point 
of view. The debtor will prefer R=r to R=0 if the difference Π j
r,H-Π j
0,H is greater than zero, or 
equivalently if the expected marginal return exceeds the cost r: 
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Case 3 bears no relevance in this context. As liquidation will never occur restructuring skills 
do not imply any efficiency gain. 
The question to be answered is the following: Do the same parameter constellations that 
satisfy the conditions above also satisfy the bank’s conditions with respect to a positive 
marginal return from investing r? The following table comprises the subgame perfect bank 
returns depending on both the signal value and her decision regarding R. 
  
  Signal  0 xL
R=r=L-((1-p)½b+c)/p xL
R=0=L+½b-c/p D-α H
  R=r 
 Action  Prob(a=aL)=p 
Prob(a= ab)=(1-p) 
ab (Restructuring) 
 Payoff  Bank  p·L+(1-p)(x+α H-½b)-c   x+α H 
  R=0 
  Action Prob(a=aL)=p       Prob(a= ab)=(1-p)  ab (Control remains with the firm) 
  Payoff Bank  p·L+(1-p)(x+α H-½b)-c  x+α H-½b 
Table 8: Comparison of bank returns in the interval [0, D-α H] 
In comparing the alternative payoffs in cases 1 and 2, respectively, we only have to examine 
two signal intervals, because in case 1 returns for R=r and R=0 are identical for signals 
                                                 
60 We assume that the entrepreneur’s agreement is needed to enter into a close relationship characterized by an 
intensive exchange of information. As a consequence, the opposite situation, in which the entrepreneur would 
prefer an arm’s length relationship but the bank itself would prefer to build up close ties is ruled out in our 
model. 
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smaller than xL
R=r and in case 2 the threshold xL
R=r vanishes. As a consequence, we can 
substitute xL
R=r by zero in the latter case. 
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Substituting for xL
R=0 and xL
R=r we obtain: 
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One of the key findings of the basic model was that from the entrepreneur’s perspective R and 
H are complements on sublattices delineated by the two cases. There, his marginal return 
from the bank’s investment in restructuring skills increases in the level of his firm-specific 
human capital H. The two inequalities (20) and (21) indicate that exactly the opposite is true 
for the bank: Her marginal return from investing in restructuring skills decreases as H is 
increased.
61 This asymmetry simplifies our proof considerably, as it will be sufficient to 
verify whether incentive compatibility is satisfied for H=h. If the bank’s marginal return from 
investing in r does exceeds that of the entrepreneur for H=h, than the same must be true for 
H=0. A higher marginal return for the bank implies that whenever the debtor prefers R=r the 
bank will follow suit. 






62. This will be the case if the following inequalities hold: 
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There exists a minimum value for D that will still guarantee the development of restructuring 
skills by the bank. As D is determined endogenously, its critical value is a function of all 
parameters. It was mentioned before that this function is very lengthy and thus does not lend 
itself for a closed-form proof. Again, we have to help ourselves by heuristically deriving 
sufficient conditions on a single parameter and then assess whether they might be binding in 
real-world settings. 
                                                 
61 The average return of the project increases in H as α H is an additive component of Π (⋅ ). Hence, a higher value 
for H leads to a higher probability that D is repaid in full. In keeping the zero-profit condition for the bank 
satisfied the debtor will as a consequence reduce the contractual repayment amount. A lower D finally 
narrows the interval in which the bank will apply her restructuring skills. 
62 In section 2.5.6, the difference Π
r,h-Π
0,h has been already derived for both cases. 
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For that purpose, let us make the plausible assumption that the initial investment I were larger 
than the maximum return from a liquidation L+α H. Because the bank’s expected payoff at t=2 
always lies between D and L+α H, it is imperative that D be larger than I. Otherwise her 
participation constraint would not be satisfied. Given that, we can substitute D in (22) and 
(23) by I and thereby obtain conditions that, once satisfied by I, must also be satisfied by the 
endogenous variable D.  
To simplify, we can substitute the parameter p by the upper bounds of its respective domain 
and then obtain: 
(24) Case  1:    () I c b L H < − − + +
2
1
1 α  
















2 1 α  
As can be easily seen, both conditions are not overly restrictive. Rather, (24) almost coincides 
with the plausible assumption from above (I >L+α H). In equilibria in which H is chosen to be 
zero condition (24) is even weaker. Condition (25) is always satisfied if I is greater than 
(1+α )H+½b which by itself should never be binding. 
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Appendix 2:  Potential financing constraints from a bank’s inability to build up 
restructuring skills 
In this Appendix we will demonstrate that there exist parameter constellations in which a bank 
of type R=r is (still) willing to grant a loan to the firm when a bank of type R=0 (already) 
refuses to do so. This amounts to stating that in these circumstances the latter would require a 
contractual repayment amount D
R=0 that is greater than the maximum amount permitted by the 
project’s profitability  x  whereas the former would require an amount D
R=r that is lower than 
this upper bound.
63  
From Appendix 1 we know that if inequality (25) holds for case 1 than the bank’s ex post 
marginal return from acquiring restructuring skills (abbreviated by MRB) will strictly exceed 
the ex ante marginal return to the entrepreneur (abbreviated by MRE), even if they are both 
negative. The entrepreneur’s decision whether to permit the bank to collect extensive 
information about his firm, depends solely on the sign of MRE. If it is negative, he will 
generally prefer an arm’s-length relationship and preclude any bank from in-depth 
investigations. If it is positive, he will invite the bank to enter a close relationship and thereby 
fully appropriate MRB – which must be positive in this situation - by decreasing the repayment 
amount  D and still satisfying the bank’s participation constraint. As a consequence, given 
MRB>0, the debtor can always reduce D by allowing a bank to build up restructuring skills and 
thus to capture part of the debtor’s potential private benefits as a reward. This does of course 
not necessarily increase MRE as the cost r now has to be borne by the entrepreneur and the 
positive effects from a smaller liquidation probability may not suffice. 
Let us assume a situation in which MRB is positive and MRE is negative. The entrepreneur will 
prefer R=0 if at the same time the bank’s participation constraint can be satisfied by D. If we 
further assume that the parameter constellation leads to D
R=0> x +α H-b, than a bank of type 
R=0 would be no longer willing to finance the project, although the expected return for the 
entrepreneur may still be positive. By offering the bank a close and exclusive relationship and 
thus sharing some of the potential private benefits with her, the entrepreneur may be able to 
reduce  D below  x +α H-b and thus get the funds to start the project. Obviously, the 
effectiveness of this maneuver will crucially depend on the cost r and the size b of the potential 
private benefits. If r is too high, the switch from R=0 to R=r will not only reduce D but may 
also make the entrepreneur’s total expected return from the project turn negative. An increase 
in b will have a compensating effect, in that it increases the required D
R=0 relative to D
R=r and 
thus allows for larger r’s. 
We can draw the following conclusion concerning incentive compatible debt contracts: If MRB 
is positive and MRE is negative, the entrepreneur may ameliorate potential financing 
constraints by simply allowing the bank to invest in restructuring skills. 
One interesting implication of our result is that a particular financial system which differs from 
another financial system only with respect to a higher value of b and a lower value of r has 
comparative advantages in financing low-profitability projects. 
                                                 
63 The maximum value that D can take on in our model is x -b+α H. This is because the moral hazard problem 
will lead to lower-than contracted bank payoffs for signals that are smaller than D-α H+b (see section 2.4.1). 
This leads to D
R=0+b>x +α H≥ D
R=r+b as the relevant condition for financing constraints brought about by the 
lack of restructuring skills to be binding. 
 